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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for maritime security
100 results foundAuthor: Bichou, Khalid Title: Security and Risk-Based Models in Shipping and Ports: Review and Critical Analysis Summary: The primary aim of maritime security assessment models is to assess the level of security within and across the maritime network. When managing risk through legislation, regulatory assessment models are used to assess risk levels and examine the impact of policy options, usually in terms of the costs and benefits of a regulatory proposal. This paper reviews the development, application and adequacy of existing risk assessment and management models to maritime and port security. In particular, it examines the problematical issues of security perception, value and impact, and discusses the limitations of the current regulatory framework in providing an integrated and effective approach to risk assessment and managment, including for supply chain security. Details: Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, International Transport Forum, 2008. 38p. Source: Internet Resource; Discussion Paper No. 2008-20 Year: 2008 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118796 Keywords: Harbors, Security MeasuresMaritime LawMaritime SecurityPort SecurityRisk AssessmentShipping, Security MeasuresSupply ChainsTransnational Crime |
Author: Vignard, Kerstin Title: Maritime Security Summary: This issue focuses on maritime security — a multifaceted and complex topic that touches on some of the most critical security challenges of the moment. Armed non-state actors are exploiting busy shipping lanes for piracy and, some fear, for terrorist purposes. In this regard, there is rising concern about the security of sensitive materials in transit by sea. This issue of Disarmament Forum examines how these maritime security risks are being addressed. It explores efforts to minimize risks of WMD proliferation through regional and international cooperation at sea, for example, the Proliferation Security Initiative. It considers the extent of the threat posed by pirates and other non-state actors at sea—with a particular emphasis on the security of maritime shipping of sensitive materials. Details: Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2010. 53p. Source: Internet Resource; Disarmament Forum, No. 2 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119467 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPiratesTerrorism |
Author: Bateman, Sam Title: Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: An Agenda for Action Summary: "This report proposes a 21-Point Action Plan for enhancing maritime safety and security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. It builds on the significant measures already identified at the 2005 Shangri-La Dialogue; in the Batam Joint Statement of the 4th Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore held in August 2005; and in the Jakarta Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore agreed at the meeting convened by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Indonesian Government in September 2005. The report focuses on maritime safety and security at sea in the Straits themselves, specifically on the need for cooperation between the different stakeholders, national governments, international and regional organizations, and the private sector, and on the measures that might be introduced to ensure maritime safety and security in the Straits. It recommends a comprehensive and integrated approach that brings together institutional arrangements and operational measures for safety, security and marine environmental protection. The ultimate objective should be to establish a system of information exchange and situational awareness in the Straits that engages the states in the approaches to the Straits (i.e. India and Thailand), as well as the main littoral countries (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore)." Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2006. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 20, 2010 at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=&lng=en&id=26417 Year: 2006 Country: Asia URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=&lng=en&id=26417 Shelf Number: 119643 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates |
Author: Bateman, Sam Title: Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia Summary: This policy paper examines the threats to good order at sea in Southeast Asia . Threats to good order include piracy and armed robbery against ships, maritime terrorism, illicit trafficking in drugs and arms, people smuggling, pollution, illegal fishing and marine natural hazards. This paper reviews the current situation and makes recommendations for non-governmental actions that would enhance cooperation in addressing the problem. Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: RSIS Policy Paper: Accessed August 20, 2010 at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_papers/RSIS_Policy%20Paper%20-%20Good%20Order%20at%20Sea_270409.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Asia URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_papers/RSIS_Policy%20Paper%20-%20Good%20Order%20at%20Sea_270409.pdf Shelf Number: 119644 Keywords: Drug SmugglingHuman SmugglingIllegal FishingIllicit TraffickingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityOffenses Against the EnvironmentPiratesWildlife Crime |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship Security, but Some Concerns Remain Summary: Over 9 million passengers departed from U.S. ports on cruise ships in 2008, and according to agency officials, cruise ships are attractive terrorist targets. GAO was asked to review cruise ship security, and this report addresses the extent to which (1) the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency on maritime security, assessed risk in accordance with the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) guidance and identified risks; and (2) federal agencies, cruise ship and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken actions to protect cruise ships and their facilities. GAO reviewed relevant requirements and agency documents on maritime security, analyzed 2006 through 2008 security operations data, interviewed federal and industry officials, and made observations at seven ports. GAO selected these locations based on factors such as the number of sailings from each port. Results of the visits provided additional information on security, but were not projectable to all ports. GAO recommends that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the unified border security agency in DHS, conduct a study to determine whether requiring cruise lines to provide passenger reservation data to CBP would benefit homeland security, and if found to be of substantial benefit, determine the appropriate mechanism to issue this requirement. DHS concurred with the recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10400.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10400.pdf Shelf Number: 119650 Keywords: Border SecurityCruise Ships, SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityTerrorism, Prevention |
Author: Weisburd, David Title: The Importance of Place in Policing: Empirical Evidence and Policy Recommendations Summary: This monograph argues that the police can be more effective if they shift the primary concerns of policing from people to places. Such a shift is already underway in American policing where place has begun to be seen as an important focus of police crime prevention effort. But even in the U.S., people and not places remain the central concern of policing. Places in this context are specific locations within the larger social environments of communities and neighborhoods. They may be defined as buildings or addresses, block faces or street segments, or as clusters of addresses, block faces or street segments that have common crime problems. This report presents research which describes from both empirical and theoretical perspectives how the police can produce substantial crime prevention effects by directing their focus at small, well-defined locations with high levels of crime. The research findings presented in this report also strongly indicate that place-based policing of this kind can prevent crime using considerably less resources than more traditional policing methods. Details: Stockholm: Brottsforebyggande radet (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention), 2010. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 25, 2010 at: http://www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=The_importance_of_place_in_policing.pdf&url=/dynamaster/file_archive/100609/d4dd5dc1d51f6c3442a975a5f37d9ef3/The%255fimportance%255fof%255fplace%255fin%255fpolicing.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=The_importance_of_place_in_policing.pdf&url=/dynamaster/file_archive/100609/d4dd5dc1d51f6c3442a975a5f37d9ef3/The%255fimportance%255fof%255fplace%255fin%255fpolicing Shelf Number: 119686 Keywords: Crime LocationsCrime PreventionDrug TraffickingMaritime Crime (Gulf of Guinea; Africa)Maritime SecurityOrganized CrimePiracyPolicingPublic SafetyPublic Spaces |
Author: Vogel, Augustus Title: Navies versus Coast Guards: Defining the Roles of African Maritime Security Forces Summary: Piracy, illegal fishing, and narcotics and human trafficking are growing rapidly in Africa and represent an increasingly central component of the threat matrix facing the continent. However, African states’ maritime security structures are often misaligned with the challenges posed and need coast guard capabilities and an array of intra-governmental partnerships. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2009. 6p Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 2: Accessed August 30, 2010 at: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/AfricaBrief_2.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Africa URL: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/AfricaBrief_2.pdf Shelf Number: 119708 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHuman TraffickingIllegal FishingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should be Reviewed Summary: U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal approaches are part of a system handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually. With the many possible threats—including transportation and detonation of weapons of mass destruction, suicide attacks against vessels, and others—in the maritime domain, awareness of such threats could give the Coast Guard advance notice to help detect, deter, interdict, and defeat them and protect the U.S. homeland and economy. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard’s efforts to achieve awareness about activity in the maritime domain. This report addresses: the extent to which the Coast Guard (1) has vessel tracking systems in place, (2) can use these systems to track vessels that may be threats, and (3) has coordinated the development and implementation of these systems. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed relevant statutes, regulations, and plans for vessel tracking systems, compared the roles of the planned systems, and interviewed appropriate officials. To ensure efficient use of resources, GAO recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard determine the extent to which duplicate vessel tracking information from LRIT and commercially provided long-range AIS is needed to accomplish Coast Guard missions, particularly in light of information already available through national technical means. DHS agreed with this recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-09-337: Accessed October 9, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09337.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09337.pdf Shelf Number: 114343 Keywords: Homeland SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityTerrorismTransportation Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa Summary: Somali pirates operating off the Horn of Africa have attacked more than 450 ships and taken nearly 2,400 hostages since 2007. A small number of U.S.-flagged vessels and ships have been among those affected. As Somalia lacks a functioning government and is unable to repress piracy in its waters, the National Security Council (NSC) developed the interagency Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan) in December 2008 to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute piracy off the Horn of Africa in collaboration with international and industry partners. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which U.S. agencies (1) have implemented the plan, and any challenges they face in doing so, and (2) have collaborated with partners in counterpiracy efforts. GAO examined counterpiracy plans, activities, collaborative practices, and data, and interviewed industry and international partners and officials at U.S. agencies and the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain. The U.S. government has made progress in implementing its Action Plan, in collaboration with international and industry partners, but pirates have adapted their tactics and expanded their area of operations, almost doubling the number of reported attacks from 2008 to 2009, and the U.S. government has yet to evaluate the costs, benefits, or effectiveness of its efforts or update its plan accordingly. The United States has advised industry partners on self-protection measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded prosecution arrangements with Kenya and the Seychelles. Officials credit collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates' rate of success in boarding ships and hijacking vessels in 2009. However, from 2007 to 2009, the most recent year for which complete data were available, the total number of hijackings reported to the International Maritime Bureau increased, ransoms paid by the shipping industry increased sharply, and attacks spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden--the focus of the Action Plan--to the vast Indian Ocean. The Action Plan's objective is to repress piracy as effectively as possible, but the effectiveness of U.S. resources applied to counterpiracy is unclear because the interagency group responsible for monitoring the Action Plan's implementation has not tracked the cost of U.S. activities--such as operating ships and aircraft and prosecuting suspected pirates--nor systematically evaluated the relative benefits or effectiveness of the Action Plan's tasks. GAO's prior work has shown that federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to evaluate their activities to identify areas for improvement. Moreover, as pirates have adapted their tactics, the Action Plan has not been revised. Without a plan that reflects new developments and assesses the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. efforts, decision makers will lack information that could be used to target limited resources to provide the greatest benefit, commensurate with U.S. interests in the region. The U.S. government has collaborated with international and industry partners to counter piracy, but it has not implemented some key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration among U.S. agencies. According to U.S. and international stakeholders, the U.S. government has shared information with partners for military coordination. However, agencies have made less progress on several key efforts that involve multiple agencies--such as those to address piracy through strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and hold pirates accountable--in part because the Action Plan does not designate which agencies should lead or carry out 13 of the 14 tasks. For instance, the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury all collect information on pirate finances, but none has lead responsibility for analyzing that information to build a case against pirate leaders or financiers. The NSC, the President's principal arm for coordinating national security policy among government agencies, could bolster interagency collaboration and the U.S. contribution to counterpiracy efforts by clarifying agency roles and responsibilities and encouraging the agencies to develop joint guidance to implement their efforts. GAO recommends that the NSC reassess and update its Action Plan; identify metrics; assess the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and clarify agency roles and responsibilities. The NSC did not comment. The Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury provided comments to clarify facts in the report. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-10-856: Accessed October 23, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10856.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10856.pdf Shelf Number: 120061 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPirates |
Author: King, Michael G., Jr. Title: Modern Piracy and Regional Security Cooperation in the Maritime Domain: The Middle East and Southeast Asia Summary: This thesis examines the development of cooperative maritime security efforts in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Recent regional efforts to combat maritime security threats in the Gulf of Aden have drawn comparisons to similar efforts undertaken in the Malacca Straits. However, such comparisons fail to address the unique nature of security cooperation in the Persian Gulf, specifically the necessity of external security support for states in the region. This thesis argues that despite similarities shared by the two regions, the states of the Persian Gulf must deal with issues of prioritization, regional animosities, and external dependence before they can attempt to develop cooperative maritime security arrangements akin to those existing in Southeast Asia. Success will require a concerted effort by these states as well as the realization, by the United States, that it is undermining effective security cooperation in the region. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 117p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed November 27, 2010 at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Mar/10Mar_King.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Mar/10Mar_King.pdf Shelf Number: 120284 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPirates (Middle East - Southeast Asia) |
Author: Hansen, Stig Jarle Title: Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconception and Remedies Summary: This report explores several of the most commonly stated causes of Somali piracy, as well as the history and structure of Somali piracy, showing that piracy is rather a spatiotemporal and geographically constrained phenomenon than a general Somali phenomenon, which started after the collapse of Somalia in 1991. Solutions must take this into consideration, focus on local conditions in the pirate areas and the causes that made piracy explode, first in 2004-2005, and most recently in 2008 and onwards. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 2009. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: NIBR Report 2009:29: Accessed November 27, 2010 at: http://www.nibr.no/uploads/publications/26b0226ad4177819779c2805e91c670d.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.nibr.no/uploads/publications/26b0226ad4177819779c2805e91c670d.pdf Shelf Number: 120285 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPirates (Somalia) |
Author: Sorenson, Karl Title: State Failure on the High Seas -- Reviewing the Somali Piracy Summary: This report makes one cardinal claim: Somali piracy will not successfully be fought by only employing naval means. The reason for this is two-fold. First, the inherent structure of any systematic piracy, to which the Somali piracy belongs, makes it difficult to stop the practice by merely focusing on impeding pirate vessels. Piracy has always been in need of at least one safe port, from where it can seek refuge, refit, and, most importantly, unload and trade the loot. Second, the state of Somalia, with its disintegration in the south, uncertainty in Puntland and relative stability in Somaliland, makes it difficult, but not impossible, to successfully target the roots, or incentives, of piracy. The political situation in Somalia is dire, and it is difficult to decipher the connections between the different regions and the complex clan system. Details: Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2008. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: FOI Somalia Papers: Report 3: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.foi.se/upload/projects/Africa/FOI-R--2610.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.foi.se/upload/projects/Africa/FOI-R--2610.pdf Shelf Number: 120296 Keywords: Maritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPirates |
Author: Hernandez, Katherine Marie G. Title: 'Pirates' in the Sea: Private Military and Security Company Activities in Southeast Asia and the Philippines Case Summary: According to a retired Colonel and Director of Security Support in Fiji, Sakiusa Ravioce, who runs the biggest of the six mercenary employment agencies in Fiji, 'private armies became a viable commercial enterprise the moment America invaded Iraq' (The Warrior Lawyer, 2008). The privatisation of warfare (or security for that matter) in Iraq and Afghanistan refers to the hiring of private military/security companies (PMSCs) by the United States government, through its state agencies, to undertake functions that were traditionally performed exclusively by members of its armed forces. The hiring of such companies is not a new phenomenon, nor is its development specific to the U.S. Outsourcing of military services may not be a new phenomenon, but PMSCs have evolved only in the past 15 years, proliferating rapidly since the end of the Cold War. This diversification can be attributed to the changing nature of conflict after 1989. The downsizing of major armies left an abundance of well-trained and experienced soldiers available to set up and be employed by PMSCs. The reduction in the size of the military at a time when numerous conflicts emerged in different parts of the world, led the U.S. government to increase military outsourcing in order to respond to these conflicts, and to manage the growing unpopularity of its war on terror on the domestic front. The privatisation of security may be a global development, but the operations of private military and security companies have different impacts across regions. This paper looks at private military and security companies in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia and how these companies have conducted their operations in the region. This paper aims to consolidate data on what has been written about private military and security groups operating in the region and the activities that they are involved in, such as the provision of security to private entities (i.e., corporate offices, business establishments, and mostly non-government clientele), training for government law enforcement personnel or a segment of the armed forces, maritime security activities, and recruitment. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series, No. 9: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/183_Working_Paper_9_-_Pirates_in_the_Sea_-_Private_Military_and_Security_Company_Activities_in_Southeast_Asia_and_the_Philippines_Case.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Asia URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/183_Working_Paper_9_-_Pirates_in_the_Sea_-_Private_Military_and_Security_Company_Activities_in_Southeast_Asia_and_the_Philippines_Case.pdf Shelf Number: 120298 Keywords: Maritime Security |
Author: Martin, Tony Title: Report on Foreign Fishing Vessel Security Issues in the Pacific Islands Region Summary: The threat of terrorist activity associated with foreign fishing vessels operating in the Pacific region is regarded as very low. These vessels do, however, represent a security risk in a number of areas: illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, people smuggling, trafficking in persons, illegal immigration, smuggling of weapons and drugs, prostitution, money laundering and corruption. The extent of risk in each of these areas is difficult to quantify with any certainty because of the lack of reliable data. At the international, regional and sub-regional levels, fisheries management is the subject of a large number of international and regional regulatory instruments. This is not the case when it comes to fishing vessel safety, training and conditions of employment of crews and protection of the marine environment where there has been a marked reluctance internationally to adopt and enforce standards. In the Pacific region, there is a lack of understanding on the part of those responsible for fisheries management, maritime administration and border management issues, of the respective roles each plays and the issues they face. Communication and information sharing between these sectors occurs infrequently if at all. In this report, specific measures are proposed to mitigate the security risks posed by foreign fishing vessels including wider use of existing information for monitoring vessels’ locations and their activities and, in due course, an ILO-based system for seafarer identification. The measures, with some modification, reflect some of the provisions of the maritime security regime (the ISPS Code) for international merchant shipping that might usefully be applied to the fishing sector for border management control purposes. Details: Noumea, New Caledonia: Regional Maritime Programme, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2005. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 10, 2010 at: dns1.spc.int/coastfish/Reports/HOF5/FFVsecurity.pdf Year: 2005 Country: Asia URL: Shelf Number: 120441 Keywords: Fishing IndustryMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityOffenses Against the EnvironmentTerrorism |
Author: Wombwell, James A. Title: The Long War Against Piracy: Historical Trends Summary: This study surveys the experience of the United States, Great Britain, and other seafaring nations in addressing the problem of piracy at sea, then derives insights from that experience that may be relevant to the suppression of the current surge of piratical activity. Wombwell, a retired naval officer, traces the course of several outbreaks of piracy during the past 300 years in a variety of geographical areas. Although each case varies in its details, Wombwell concludes that enough similarities exist to permit several useful generalizations. Among these are the causes of piracy, the factors that permit the behavior to flourish, and the range of countermeasures that have been available to policymakers seeking to eradicate the problem. When conditions are favorable for piracy to develop, and no strong response is made by the forces of law and order, what began as low-level brigandage often grows to outrageous proportions, ultimately requiring significant military resources to suppress or eliminate the threat posed to legitimate commerce. Details: Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2010. 195p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper 32: Accessed December 14, 2010 at: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/wombwell_32.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/wombwell_32.pdf Shelf Number: 120498 Keywords: Historical StudiesMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPirates |
Author: Liss, Carolin Title: Privatising Anti-Piracy Services in Strategically Important Waterways: Risks, Challenges and Benefits Summary: In the past few years, an increasing number of Private Security Companies (PSCs – also sometimes referred to as Private Military Companies, PMCs) have emerged offering and conducting Anti-Piracy Services. These companies offer services in addition to security provided by states and their government agencies. PSCs are today hired to provide anti-piracy services in different parts of the world, but mostly in strategically important waterways where piracy is a serious security concern. This paper examines the employment of PSCs in two such waterways, namely the Malacca Straits and the Gulf of Aden, and discusses the risks, challenges and benefits of privatising maritime security. Details: Hongo, Bunkyo-Ku, Japan: Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo, 2009. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: GraSPP Working Paper Series: Accessed December 14, 2010 at: http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/documents/GraSPP-DP-E-09-003OPU-DP-E-09-001.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Asia URL: http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/documents/GraSPP-DP-E-09-003OPU-DP-E-09-001.pdf Shelf Number: 120504 Keywords: Maritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPiratesPrivate SecurityPrivatization |
Author: Bradford, John Title: Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: U.S., Japanese, Regional, and Industry Strategies Summary: Pirate activity in strategically important waterways around the globe, from the Strait of Malacca to the waters off the Horn of Africa, has garnered significant attention recently from states dependent on these waters for international trade and the free movement of goods. State responses have ranged from independently dispatching naval forces to patrol major sea lines of communication, to multinational patrols and information sharing mechanisms to increase domain awareness. Less visible, but of equal-or perhaps greater-importance are the efforts of ship owners, operators, and maritime industry groups toward increasing ship security and combating pirate attacks. Originally presented at a workshop NBR collaborated on with the Japan Forum on International Relations in Tokyo, Japan, in May 2010, this special report focuses on U.S., Japanese, regional, and industry strategies to combat piracy and other maritime security threats in Southeast Asian waterways. Details: Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: NBR Special Report #24: Accessed December 16, 2010 at: http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/SR24_MaritimeSecurity.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Asia URL: http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/SR24_MaritimeSecurity.pdf Shelf Number: 120532 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiratesPirates/Piracy |
Author: Bellamy, Liam Title: What Can Be Done To Counter Somali Piracy? Summary: This paper examines the tactical options available to ships that are under threat from piracy off the Somali coast. It argues that we may be witnessing the first asymmetric naval campaign and that vessels should adopt protective tactics to match this reality and the changing tactics of the pirates themselves. Details: Athens, Greece: Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), 2009. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper No. 129: Accessed December 17, 2010 at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=97573 Year: 2009 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=97573 Shelf Number: 120539 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Moller, Bjorn Title: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Naval Strategy Summary: Piracy is an old problem which is now again attracting attention, mainly because of the surge of pirate attacks off the coasts of Somalia. Closer analysis shows the problem to be of quite modest proportions. The international naval protection of merchant shipping holds out some prospects of containing the problem, but it is most likely to solve itself. If international shipping opts for the route south of Africa, piracy will die out for a lack of targets. Maritime terrorism is, likewise, a problem of very limited proportions. It is often conflated with piracy, but there are significant differences between the two phenomena, the latter being undertaken for selfish reasons, the former for the sake of some higher cause. Whereas it is conceivable that maritime terrorists will gradually transform themselves into pirates, a transformation in the opposite direction is well nigh inconceivable. Besides the analysis of these two phenomena, the overlap between them and certain naval strategies are also briefly touched upon. Details: Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, 2009. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: DIIS Report 2009:02: Accessed December 21, 2010 at: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009-02_%20Piracy_maritime_terrorism_and_naval_strategy.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009-02_%20Piracy_maritime_terrorism_and_naval_strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 120561 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/PiracyTerrorism |
Author: Raidt, John Title: Advancing U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain Summary: This report presents the analysis and recommendations of the Atlantic Council’s Michael S. Ansari Africa Center in cooperation with the On the Horizon Project to advance U.S. strategic interests in West Africa. Unaddressed problems of poor governance, severe poverty, widespread public corruption, and growing insecurity from the presence of criminal and militant enterprises engaged in theft, terrorism, trafficking, piracy, poaching, and pollution will continue to punish local populations and create conditions of instability that undermine public order from greater levels of armed confl ict and mass migration and threaten the reliable flow of oil from the region. As noted in a recent United Nations report, the “combination of coups from the top and insurgencies from below render West Africa in the opinion of the UN the least politically stable region in the world.” While this report focuses on the maritime domain, the Atlantic Council approaches the regional security challenges from a broad perspective. Security issues are holistic and must be addressed as such. The dynamics and consequences of insecurity in the maritime domain are part of a wider, more complex political and security dynamic encompassing rule of law, governance, public capacities, and economic and human development across geographic, societal, and national domains. Just as the causes, manifestations, and consequences of insecurity are comprehensive, so too must be the preventatives and remedies. This document provides a broad strategic-level analysis and corresponding recommendations for action that can, and we believe should, be supported and implemented by U.S. and allied policymakers, African leaders, and key stakeholders. Details: Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2010. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2011 at: http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/advancing-us-african-global-interests-security-stability-west-africa-maritime-domain.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Africa URL: http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/advancing-us-african-global-interests-security-stability-west-africa-maritime-domain.pdf Shelf Number: 120632 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPoachingTerrorismTraffickingTransnational Crime |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address Risks Posed by Seafarers, but Efforts Can Be Strengthened Summary: The State Department and two components of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard, are responsible for preventing illegal immigration at U.S. seaports and identifying individuals who are potential security risks. The International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention (ILO 185) to establish an international framework of seafarer identification documents and reduce their vulnerability to fraud and exploitation. GAO was asked to examine (1) measures federal agencies take to address risks posed by foreign seafarers and the challenges, if any, DHS faces; (2) the challenges, if any, DHS faces in tracking illegal entries by foreign seafarers and how it enforces penalties; and (3) the implementation status of ILO 185. GAO reviewed relevant requirements and agency documents on maritime security, interviewed federal and industry officials, and visited seven seaports based on volume of seafarer arrivals. The visits provided insights, but were not projectable to all seaports. GAO recommends that DHS assess risks of not electronically verifying cargo vessel seafarers for admissibility, identify reasons for absconder and deserter data variances, and, with the Department of Justice (DOJ), develop a plan with timelines to adjust civil monetary penalties for inflation. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO’s recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-195: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11195.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11195.pdf Shelf Number: 120669 Keywords: Cargo SecurityImmigrationMaritime CrimeMaritime SecuritySeaports |
Author: Carafano, James Jay Title: Taking the Fight to the Pirates: Applying Counterterrorist Methods to the Threat of Priacy Summary: Piracy is a growing threat to global commerce and is becoming a U.S. security issue. While anti-piracy efforts have successfully reduced piracy in the Malacca Strait, Somali pirates have expanded their operations further into the Indian Ocean. Ending the threat from Somali pirates will require shifting from a defensive posture of trying to protect ships passing through the high-risk zones—there are too many ships, too few military vessels, and too many pirates—to an offensive strategy of attacking the pirates at their weak points. The United States and other countries should use every means at their disposal to deny the pirates any safe haven—geographical, financial, or legal—and bring them to justice wherever it is most convenient. Details: Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2011. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Backgrounder No. 2524: Accessed March 14, 2011 at: http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2524.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2524.pdf Shelf Number: 120929 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Vogel, Augustus Title: Investing in Science and Technology to Meet Africa’s Maritime Security Challenges Summary: A growing number of Africa’s security challenges – narcotics trafficking, piracy, illegal fishing, and armed robberies, among others – take place at sea. Illicit actors exploit Africa’s maritime space given its expansiveness and the limited number of vessels African governments can field to interdict this activity. In this Africa Security Brief, Augustus Vogel argues that technology can dramatically improve Africa’s maritime security coverage. However, to do so will require engaging Africa’s scientists who can guide and sustain these efforts. This will yield not only security but environmental and meteorological benefits for the continent. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 10: Accessed March 15, 2011 at: http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/ACSS-Research-Papers/ACSS-10.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/ACSS-Research-Papers/ACSS-10.pdf Shelf Number: 120917 Keywords: Drug TraffickingIllegal FishingKidnappingsMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesViolence (Africa) |
Author: Caldwell, Stephen L. Title: Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa Summary: As GAO reported in September 2010, the U.S. government has made progress in implementing its plan for countering piracy, in collaboration with industry and international partners. However, piracy is an escalating problem, and the U.S. government has not updated its plan as GAO recommended. The United States has advised industry partners on self-protection measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded a prosecution arrangement with the Seychelles. Many stakeholders credit collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates' rate of success in boarding ships and hijacking vessels, but since 2007 the location of attacks has spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden--the focus of the Action Plan--to the vast and much harder to patrol Indian Ocean. Also, from 2007 to 2010 the total number of reported hijackings increased sevenfold, and, after dropping in 2008 and 2009, the pirates' success rate rebounded from 22 percent in 2009 to almost 30 percent in 2010. In addition, the number of hostages captured and the amount of ransom paid increased sharply, and pirate attacks have grown more violent. The Action Plan's objective is to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa as effectively as possible, but as pirate operations have evolved, changes to the plan have not kept pace. The United States has not systematically tracked the costs of its counterpiracy efforts and is unable to determine whether counterpiracy investments are achieving the desired results. According to a statement by an NSS official, the United States is reviewing U.S. piracy policy to focus future U.S. efforts. These recent steps are encouraging because the growing frequency and severity of piracy off the Horn of Africa provides a renewed sense of urgency for taking action. GAO's September 2010 report found that U.S. agencies have generally collaborated well with international and industry partners to counter piracy, but they could take additional steps to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration. According to U.S. and international stakeholders, the U.S. government has, among other things, collaborated with international partners to support prosecution of piracy suspects and worked with industry partners to educate ship owners on how to protect their vessels from pirate attack. However, agencies have made less progress on several key efforts that involve multiple U.S. agencies--such as those to address piracy through strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and hold pirates accountable. For instance, the departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury all collect or examine information on pirate finances, but none has lead responsibility for analyzing that information to build a case against pirate leaders or financiers. In September 2010, GAO recommended that the NSC identify roles and responsibilities for implementing these tasks, and develop guidance to ensure agency efforts work together efficiently and effectively. In March 2011, an NSS official stated that an interagency policy review will examine roles and responsibilities and implementation actions to focus U.S. efforts for the next several years. It is too early to assess this effort's effectiveness in bolstering interagency collaboration in U.S. counterpiracy efforts. GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. GAO previously recommended that the NSC (1) update its Action Plan; (2) assess the costs and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and (3) clarify agency roles and responsibilities. A National Security Staff (NSS) official provided a statement that an interagency group is reviewing U.S. piracy policy, costs, metrics, roles, and responsibilities. Agencies also commented to clarify information in this statement Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-449T: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11449t.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11449t.pdf Shelf Number: 121026 Keywords: Hijackings of ShipsHostagesMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Lords. European Union Committee Title: Combating Somali Piracy: the EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta: Report with Evidence Summary: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean is a serious and ongoing threat to UK and EU interests. It could spread within the region, which is unstable. The EU’s Operation Atalanta, with its operational headquarters based in Northwood, UK, has made a strong contribution to combating piracy, in particular protecting World Food Programme (WFP) ships and coordinating with other maritime forces in the area. However there are a number of areas that need improvement and require action. Naval vessels and their crews are very expensive resources in short supply. With more surveillance aircraft the Atalanta fleet could be far more effective and efficient. Similarly, the permanent availability of a tanker would prevent Atalanta vessels from having to return to port on a regular basis solely to refuel. The WFP’s use of small, slow ships makes them especially vulnerable to pirate attacks. As a result they require greater military protection and resources. The Government and the EU should insist that the WFP charter faster, larger and more modern vessels. It is even more efficient for military contingents to be placed on these vessels rather than having warships and their crew shadowing each delivery. It should be a condition of the award of a WFP contract that, when requested, the flag state allow these vessels to carry Atalanta military forces on board. Military personnel placed on commercial shipping should be given specialised training. We agree with UK policy that private security guards should not be placed on commercial shipping because of the increased risks to crew and ships. The insurance industry is not taking sufficient responsibility for ensuring that commercial shipping transiting the area complies with readily available, tried and tested procedures to reduce the risk of capture by pirates. At a minimum the industry should impose increased insurance premiums on ship operators who do not comply. We agree with the increasingly robust action taken against pirates by Atalanta forces. There is a need to change the perceived risk/reward ratio for pirate activity. We welcome the EU’s agreements with Kenya and the Seychelles to prosecute pirates, and the negotiations now taking place with other states in the region. We wait to see the number of successful prosecutions that result. There will be no solution to the problem of piracy without a solution to the root causes of the conflict on land in Somalia. We support the EU’s efforts to deal with Somalia’s problems by building up the security sector in line with democratic norms, providing humanitarian assistance and assisting the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland to strengthen their coastguards. Details: London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2010. 114p. Source: Internet Resource: 12th Report of Session 2009-10: Accessed March 29, 2011 at: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/103/103.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/103/103.pdf Shelf Number: 121191 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: Mair, Stefan, ed. Title: Piracy and Maritime Security: Regional Characteristics and Political, Military, Legal and Economic Implications Summary: Maritime security has deteriorated over the past 15 years, with a sharp increase in pirate attacks on vessels and installations. The worst affected region is no longer Southeast Asia (in particular the Straits of Malacca) but the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. Although the issue attracts enormous public attention in Europe, the direct economic costs are actually relatively limited. Piracy and maritime insecurity become a matter for action by the international community principally when the direct economic impact becomes conflated with a complex situation of regional insecurity. In that case military action is central to containing the problem. But a purely military operation cannot eliminate the causes of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, in the Somali Basin or anywhere else. As the example of the Straits of Malacca demonstrates, multilateral international efforts to resolve political conflicts and establish effective statehood are crucial. Details: Berlin:Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), 2011. 94p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2011 at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2011_RP03_mrs_ks.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2011_RP03_mrs_ks.pdf Shelf Number: 121306 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Petersen, Kim Title: TranSystems' Florida Seaport Security Assessment 2010 Summary: Prior to the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) in 2002, the state of Florida was extremely proactive in securing its deepwater ports with the passage of Florida Statute [FS] 311.12 Seaport Security Standards in 2000. This research explores the history, impact, and areas of overlap that FS 311.12 and the MTSA security standards have upon Florida’s major seaports. The research includes: 1) an historical analysis of the 1999 Camber Report; 2) a federal and state statutory regulation comparison; 3) a review of the Seaport Security Standards Advisory Council 2008 recommendations & FS 311 review; 4) U.S. port security regulatory review 2000-2009; 5) a comparison of aviation and maritime security regulations; 6) state and federal regulation evaluation – Layered Security; 7) a document review to analyze Florida ports’ physical security and operations; 8) a combined Florida risk assessment update; 9) an analysis of the security costs incurred by Florida’s ports vs. comparable ports that are not required to meet a state port security standard; and 10) an overlap analysis of the Florida Uniform Port Access Credential (FUPAC) against the Transportation Workers Identification Credential (TWIC). The report contains findings and recommendations associated with each of the listed tasks. Details: Tallahassee, FL: Florida Division of Emergency Management, Florida Office of Drug Control, 2010. 173p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 14, 2011 at: http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/2902b533-5d31-4876-9ad6-1cb2a01a2c65/100409_Florida_Seaports_SecurityAssessment_Report.aspx Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/2902b533-5d31-4876-9ad6-1cb2a01a2c65/100409_Florida_Seaports_SecurityAssessment_Report.aspx Shelf Number: 121336 Keywords: Maritime Crime (Florida)Maritime SecurityRisk AssessmentSeaports |
Author: Brannon, Stephen Title: Global Challenge, Regional Responses: Forging a Common Approach to Maritime Piracy Summary: Once thought to be the scourge of a bygone age, maritime piracy has re-emerged in recent years as a serious threat to both crews and property on the high seas. Globally, attacks have risen from 239 in 2006 to 445 in 2010, with 1181 seafarers taken hostage taken last year alone. The total annual economic cost is estimated at $7-12 billion. Despite growing awareness of the threat, and a variety of national, regional and international initiatives, the tide of piracy continues to rise. It is in this context that the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DP World convened the conference entitled “Global Challenge, Regional Responses: Forging a Common Approach to Maritime Piracy,” held in Dubai on April 18-19, 2011. The gathering brought leaders from government, the shipping industry and non-governmental organizations together with renowned experts in the field of counter-piracy to discuss ways in which the international response to the global challenge of maritime piracy might be supported and enhanced, and to identify specific, tangible opportunities for collaborative action. In order to stimulate innovative thinking on the subject, the conference organizers engaged the Dubai School of Government to commission a series of short briefing papers reflecting the cutting edge of academic and expert thought on piracy and related issues. These papers correspond to the four conference content categories: General Background and Regional Overviews; Addressing Root Causes; Opportunities for Information Sharing and Civil-Military Cooperation; and, Relevant Issues in International Law. The selected papers cover a wide range of topics and broach a number of key themes, ranging from the hidden economy of piracy to the plight of captive seafarers. Collectively, however, the papers share a common perspective: In spite of substantial investments in a number of areas, the current international response falls short of what is required to end this phenomenon. Furthermore, an effective and enduring solution to the global challenge of maritime piracy must entail a long-term, comprehensive effort, both onshore and offshore, which involves all relevant public and private sector stakeholders. Details: Dubai: Dubai School of Government, 2011. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2011 at: http://www.dsg.ae/PUBLICATIONS/PublicationDetail.aspx?udt_826_param_detail=3099 Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.dsg.ae/PUBLICATIONS/PublicationDetail.aspx?udt_826_param_detail=3099 Shelf Number: 121456 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Delicato, Vincenzo Title: Maritime Security and the Fight Against Drug Trafficking in the Mediterranean and Atlantic Approaches Summary: The Mediterranean Sea is particularly affected by illicit trafficking in drugs. Italy’s Public Security Department of the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for all initiatives aimed at preventing and combating illicit drug trafficking in Italy and is also entrusted with planning and coordinating sea activities. In the last few years, a set of international rules has been drawn up to facilitate intervention at sea and standardize control procedures. In the field of drug trafficking, ad hoc European regulations have been developed and two centers for analysis and coordination in operations against drug trafficking at sea set up. However, Italy — while participating in the most recent operational cooperation initiatives — has not yet ratified the Council of Europe agreement implementing article 17 of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. It would be desirable to adopt more comprehensive legislative measures and establish intervention criteria for all law enforcement actors involved. Details: Washington, DC: Th e German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Mediterranean Paper Series 2010: Accessed May 19, 2011 at: http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Delicato_drugs_final_Sept10.pdf;jsessionid=aJAqWaBkuOX8Pfhoia Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Delicato_drugs_final_Sept10.pdf;jsessionid=aJAqWaBkuOX8Pfhoia Shelf Number: 121761 Keywords: Drug TraffickingMaritime CrimeMaritime Security |
Author: Ploch, Lauren Title: Piracy Off the Horn of Africa Summary: Pirate attacks in the waters off Somalia and the Horn of Africa, including those on U.S.-flagged vessels, have brought renewed international attention to the long-standing problem of maritime piracy. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), at least 219 attacks occurred in the region in 2010, with 49 successful hijackings. Somali pirates have attacked ships in the Gulf of Aden, along Somalia’s eastern coastline, and outward into the Indian Ocean. Using increasingly sophisticated tactics, these pirates now operate as far east as the Maldives in good weather, and as far south as the Mozambique Channel. Hostage taking for ransom has been a hallmark of Somali piracy, and the IMB reports that more hostages, over 1,180, were taken at sea in 2010 than any year since records began; over 86% of those were taken by Somali pirates. The increase in pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa is directly linked to continuing insecurity and the absence of the rule of law in war-torn Somalia. The absence of a functioning central government there provides freedom of action for pirates and remains the single greatest challenge to regional security. The lack of law enforcement capacity creates a haven where pirates hold hostages during ransom negotiations that can last for months. Some allege that the absence of Somali coastal security authorities has allowed illegal international fishing and maritime dumping to go unchecked, which in turn has undermined coastal communities’ economic prospects, providing economic or political motivation to some pirates. The apparent motive of most pirate groups, however, is profit, and piracy has proven to be lucrative. Somalia’s “pirate economy” has grown substantially in the past two years, with ransoms now averaging more than $5 million. These revenues may further exacerbate the ongoing conflict and undermine regional security. The annual cost of piracy to the global economy ranges between $7 and $12 billion, by some estimates. The U.N Security Council has issued a series of resolutions since 2008 to facilitate an international response, which is coordinated by a multilateral Contact Group. The Council has authorized international navies to counter piracy both in Somali territorial waters and ashore, with the consent of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and has also authorized, as an exemption to the U.N. arms embargo on Somalia, support for the TFG security forces. Counter-piracy patrols by multinational naval forces near Somalia are intended to compliment mariners’ self-protection measures. Increased patrols and proactive efforts by ships have reduced attacks in the Gulf of Aden, but the U.N. Secretary-General warns that “while the effectiveness of naval disruption operations has increased and more pirates have been arrested and prosecuted, this has not stopped piracy. The trend of the increased levels of violence employed by the pirates as well as their expanding reach is disconcerting.” Some suggest that a perception of impunity exists among pirates and financiers; nine out of ten Somali pirates apprehended by naval patrols are reportedly released because no jurisdiction is prepared to prosecute them. The United States has sought to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute Somali piracy through a range of interagency and multilateral coordination and enforcement mechanisms. The Obama Administration has initiated a new “dual track” policy toward Somalia, where some contend that international efforts to build a credible central authority have failed. Congress has examined options to address piracy both diplomatically and militarily. Congress appropriates funding and provides oversight for policy initiatives with implications for piracy in the region, including maritime security assistance to regional governments, support to peacekeeping operations in Somalia, and funding for U.S. Navy operations. Congress continues to debate options for addressing pirate safe havens and improving the prospects for prosecution of pirate suspects. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 24, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf Shelf Number: 121821 Keywords: Hijacking of ShipsMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/PiracyRansom |
Author: Medcalf, Rory Title: Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific Asia Summary: The sea lanes of Indo-Pacific Asia are becoming more crowded, contested and vulnerable to armed strife. The changing deterrence and warfighting strategies of China, the United States and Japan involve expanded maritime patrolling and intrusive surveillance, bringing an uncertain mix of stabilising and destabilising effects. Nationalism and resource needs, meanwhile, are reinforcing the value of territorial claims in the East and South China seas, making maritime sovereignty disputes harder to manage. Chinese forces continue to show troubling signs of assertiveness at sea, though there is debate about the origins or extent of such moves. All of these factors are making Asia a danger zone for incidents at sea. While the chance that such incidents will lead to major military clashes should not be overstated, the drivers – in particular China’s frictions with the United States, Japan and India – are likely to persist and intensify. As the number and tempo of incidents increases, so does the likelihood that an episode will escalate to armed confrontation, diplomatic crisis or possibly even conflict. This report, part of the Lowy Institute’s MacArthur Foundation Asia Security Project, explores the major-power maritime security dynamics surrounding China’s rise. It focuses on the risks and the management of incidents at sea involving Chinese interactions with the United States, Japan and India. The report concludes with some realistic recommendations to reduce risks of crisis and escalation under conditions of continued mistrust. Details: Sydney: Lowry Institute for International Policy, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 30, 2011 at: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1618 Year: 2011 Country: Asia URL: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1618 Shelf Number: 121924 Keywords: Maritime Crime (Asia)Maritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: D'Agostino, Davi M. Title: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness Summary: Maritime security threats to the United States are broad, including the naval forces of potential adversary nations, terrorism, and piracy. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in Mumbai in 2008, and on the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these very real threats. The Department of Defense (DOD) considers maritime domain awareness — that is, identifying threats and providing commanders with sufficient awareness to make timely decisions — a means for facilitating effective action in the maritime domain and critical to its homeland defense mission. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy to manage its maritime domain awareness efforts and uses a risk-based approach. GAO analyzed national and DOD documents; interviewed DOD and interagency maritime domain awareness officials; and conducted site visits to select facilities engaged in maritime related activities. This report is a public version of a previous, sensitive report. GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop and implement a strategy with objectives, roles, and responsibilities for maritime domain awareness, aligns with DOD’s corporate process, identifies capability resourcing responsibilities, and includes performance measures; and (2) perform a comprehensive risk-based analysis, including prioritized capability gaps and future investments. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-621: Accessed July 7, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11621.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11621.pdf Shelf Number: 122007 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/PiracyTerrorism |
Author: Birch, Paul R. Title: Old Glory and the Jolly Roger: The Cultural Constraints and Strategic Imperatives of Modern Piracy Summary: This thesis discusses piracy on the open seas. It describes acts of piracy, puts the practice into historical perspective, and shows how a recent surge in maritime piracy incidents differs from other maritime piracy afflicting the world’s oceans at the turn of the twentyfirst century. This is half of the reason for writing. The second purpose for is to examine the US military response to the dramatic increase in piracy near Somalia that occurred in 2008. The thesis examines the US response through the theoretical lenses of strategic culture and structural realism. These theories seldom appear alongside each other in security studies literature; their juxtaposition explains the US behavior toward the contemporary African piracy epidemic and provides a framework for examining other national security issues. This thesis concludes that although certain national security elites push US strategic culture toward interventionist or isolationist extremes, some world events elicit foregone responses best described by the ideas of structural realism. Tacit realization by national security actors that these events exist in spite of what elite groups profess or desire in turn defines strategic culture in a fundamentally different way. Given its place in the existing world order, the United States had little choice but to respond to piracy, even though its strategic preference was to ignore the problem. The valuable lesson from piracy represents in microcosm many problems of national strategy. If US cultural preference is again at odds with a strategic imperative to use force, and elites indulge the former, the nation may forfeit its structural role as the world’s existing hegemon. This is historically significant, as ceding the role of hegemon at this time would be a voluntary act, not forced by a stronger nation or an altered balance of power. The United States would become the first superpower to lay down that mantle voluntarily. Although US foreign policy appears now to have reconciled strategic cultural preferences with structural imperatives in the case of piracy, strategists must recognize the potential for the same kind of tension in all international relations problems. If the tension between preference and imperatives goes unresolved, the outcome can diminish national power. The United States should not proceed down that path unawares. Details: Maxwell AFB, AL: School Of Advanced Air And Space Studies Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 2009. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 10, 2011 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA540653 Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA540653 Shelf Number: 122365 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Mansfield, Charles T. Title: Modern Piracy: The Impact on Maritime Security Summary: Although acts of piracy are generally criminal as opposed to terrorist in nature, their unpredictable time and location of occurrence, the wide variety of vessels targeted, and their increasing frequency creates an opportunity for terrorists to use pirates' methods as a means to achieve their goals. This paper will provide a brief historical perspective on piracy, examine its modern dimensions, and analyze the impact of modern piracy on U.S. maritime security. The thesis examines the efforts that U.S. and foreign governments, military, business, and civilian organizations expend to combat the problem, and piracy's tangible costs in capital resources to combat. The sea, a largely unregulated space, is a safe haven for criminals and terrorists to act unopposed by military or law enforcement efforts. Although piracy is generally not politically motivated, it is invariably linked to prevailing political conditions and the proximity of weak or failed states. Since the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, the international community has been forced to assess the vulnerabilities of maritime security. In the post- 9/11 and USS Cole era, there has been a resurgence in worldwide piracy incidents. The increase in attacks has demanded the serious attention of global maritime trading partners. The possible use of a maritime vessel as a weapon is a real and credible threat. The United States and her maritime partners are constantly working to achieve a secure global maritime environment. The focus is on assisting failed and failing states to create functional governments that will develop their law enforcement and coast guard capabilities. Until these weak and lawless lands can maintain control of their territorial waters, the global maritime partners will be required to use their naval and law enforcement assets to patrol piracy hot spots to prevent a further escalation of robberies, violence, and potentially terrorist acts. Details: Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps, Command and State College, 2008. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2011 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA490682&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA490682&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Shelf Number: 122431 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/PiracyTerrorism |
Author: Termansen, Dan B. Title: Counter Piracy Off Somalia; A Case for Applying the Comprehensive Approach Strategy Summary: Some argue for a robust military solution inside Somalia to counter the piracy problem while others maintain that the problem is not at all suited for employing military force. Many articles focus on the impact of piracy on the International Shipping. Only very few take a holistic view on the issue, and discuss 2. or 3. order consequences of piracy in the area as a whole. Counter Piracy Operations have been going on for some years but, so far, only military means have been employed by the international community to counter piracy in the region. No unified holistic strategy has been applied, even though there seems to be consensus that the root causes are found in Somalia itself. With a holistic focus on the piracy issue off the coast of Somalia, this paper will analyze the root causes of piracy, the actors to influence, the Push-Pull factors and balance of risk involved. The paper identifies that the international community has so far primarily addressed the Pull factors focusing on naval force, disrupting pirate camps and law enforcement while leaving the Push Factors ashore largely unaddressed. Looking towards Afghanistan, the paper suggests employing elements in NATO's Comprehensive Approach in order to address all factors driving piracy, and recommends a design for how the Comprehensive Approach can be applied to the case of Somalia. The paper combines the current military efforts on Counter Piracy with a local civilian support to the Somali costal population primarily in Northeastern Somalia in a mutually supportive way From the Sea suggesting a naval PRT construction supporting Ink Blots of engagements ashore. In contrast to Afghanistan, the suggested Comprehensive Approach is applied bottom up, because it is focused only to counter piracy leaving the strategic effort to restore governance in Somalia to another time horizon. Details: Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2011 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536267&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536267&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Shelf Number: 122437 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: Kilpatrick, Richard L., Jr. Title: Borrowing from Civil Aviation Security: Does International Law Governing Airline Hijacking Offer Solutions to the Modern Maritime Piracy Epidemic Off the Coast of Somalia? Summary: Maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia continues to spiral into an increasingly threatening international crisis, with attacks in the Gulf of Aden increasing during the first half of 2011. While more states have been prosecuting pirates in their national courts during the last year, United Nations officials have indicated that as many as 90 percent of pirates captured by national navies are subsequently released due to complicated legal and financial burdens associated with prosecution. In the search for solutions to the current maritime piracy problem, international legal initiatives addressing civil aviation security may offer insight. A global trend of airline hijackings beginning in the late 1960s and culminating in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, catalyzed various initiatives that have improved the efficacy of aviation security. The international legal regime governing civil aviation security developed through various international treaties, conventions, agreements, declarations, and resolutions from important international institutions. Likewise, the United States, as the world’s largest aviation market, has also contributed to the international civil aviation regime through its domestic legislation. Taken together, this broad international legal regime offers a valuable example of cooperation and collaboration between various international stakeholders to address a trend in international crime. While there are limitations that must be considered in drawing an analogy between airline hijackings and maritime piracy due to contextual and legal distinctions, there are significant similarities that foster effective comparison of approaches. In particular, the civil aviation security regime may inform the following initiatives relevant to maritime piracy: the elimination of safe havens through the enforcement of international agreements obliging states to prosecute piracy crimes; increased port security to ensure the use of Best Management Practices to avoid piratical acts; economic sanctions targeting financers of piracy crimes; and enhanced communication and coordination among stakeholders affected by the piracy crises. Details: Louisvilla, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, 2011. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: OBP Working Paper: Accessed August 22, 2011 at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/kilpatrick_borrowing_from_civil_aviation.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Somalia URL: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/kilpatrick_borrowing_from_civil_aviation.pdf Shelf Number: 122446 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: Osiro, Deborah Title: Somali Pirates Have Rights Too: Judicial Consequences and Human Rights Concerns Summary: The international community’s counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia has had limited success, despite a proliferation of initiatives and resources. Although the large military presence has increased the number of piracy suspects that are being brought to trial, it has not reduced the number of pirates taking to the high seas. Rather, the increased militarisation and the strategies designed to bypass human rights obligations vis-à-vis the Somali pirates has undermined the credibility of the counter-piracy initiatives. The regional piracy prosecutions in Kenya, in particular, have raised various human rights issues, such as the failure to observe due process and the lack of appropriate jurisdiction. This paper highlights the fact that the strategy of enforcing legal accountability for pirates at sea but not for those on shore breeds a disregard for the human rights of a very vulnerable group of people, and results in an increase in piratical activities Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 224: Accessed August 23, 2011 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1860.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1860.pdf Shelf Number: 122470 Keywords: Human RightsMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11 Summary: The events of September 11, 2001, led to profound changes in government policies and structures to confront homeland security threats. Most notably, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began operations in 2003 with key missions that included preventing terrorist attacks from occurring in the United States, and minimizing the damages from any attacks that may occur. DHS is now the third-largest federal department, with more than 200,000 employees and an annual budget of more than $50 billion. Since 2003, GAO has issued over 1,000 products on DHS's operations in such areas as border and transportation security and emergency management, among others. As requested, this report addresses DHS's progress in implementing its homeland security missions since it began operations, work remaining, and issues affecting implementation efforts. This report is based on GAO's past and ongoing work, supplemented with DHS Office of Inspector General reports, with an emphasis on reports issued since 2008. GAO also analyzed information provided by DHS in July and August 2011 on recent actions taken in response to prior work. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and milestones in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential. As it continues to mature, however, more work remains for DHS to address gaps and weaknesses in its current operational and implementation efforts, and to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts to achieve its full potential. DHS's accomplishments include developing strategic and operational plans; deploying workforces; and establishing new, or expanding existing, offices and programs. For example, DHS (1) issued plans to guide its efforts, such as the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which provides a framework for homeland security, and the National Response Framework, which outlines disaster response guiding principles; (2) successfully hired, trained, and deployed workforces, such as a federal screening workforce to assume security screening responsibilities at airports nationwide; and (3) created new programs and offices to implement its homeland security responsibilities, such as establishing the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team to help coordinate efforts to address cybersecurity threats. Such accomplishments are noteworthy given that DHS has had to work to transform itself into a fully functioning department while implementing its missions--a difficult undertaking that can take years to achieve. While DHS has made progress, its transformation remains high risk due to its management challenges. Examples of progress made and work remaining include: Border security. DHS implemented the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program to verify the identities of foreign visitors entering and exiting the country by processing biometric and biographic information. However, DHS has not yet determined how to implement a biometric exit capability and has taken action to address a small portion of the estimated overstay population in the United States (individuals who legally entered the country but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission). Aviation security. DHS developed and implemented Secure Flight, a program for screening airline passengers against terrorist watchlist records. DHS also developed new programs and technologies to screen passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo. However, DHS does not yet have a plan for deploying checked baggage screening technologies to meet recently enhanced explosive detection requirements, a mechanism to verify the accuracy of data to help ensure that air cargo screening is being conducted at reported levels, or approved technology to screen cargo once it is loaded onto a pallet or container. Emergency preparedness and response. DHS issued the National Preparedness Guidelines that describe a national framework for capabilities-based preparedness, and a Target Capabilities List to provide a national-level generic model of capabilities defining all-hazards preparedness. DHS is also finalizing a National Disaster Recovery Framework, and awards preparedness grants based on a reasonable risk methodology. However, DHS needs to strengthen its efforts to assess capabilities for all-hazards preparedness, and develop a long-term recovery structure to better align timing and involvement with state and local governments' capacity. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. DHS assessed risks posed by CBRN threats and deployed capabilities to detect CBRN threats. However, DHS should work to improve its coordination of CBRN risk assessments, and identify monitoring mechanisms for determining progress made in implementing the global nuclear detection strategy. GAO's work identified three themes at the foundation of DHS's challenges. This report contains no new recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 225p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-881: Accessed September 12, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11881.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11881.pdf Shelf Number: 122718 Keywords: Aviation SecurityCounter-TerrorismCyber SecurityHomeland Security (U.S.)ImmigrationMaritime SecurityRisk ManagementTerrorismTransportation Security |
Author: Whiteneck, Daniel J. Title: Piracy Enterprises in Africa Summary: Piracy has a long history in all areas of Africa, and the navies of nations affected by that piracy have a long history of counterpiracy operations all around the continent. This report examines the background and development of piracy off Somalia and in the Gulf of Guinea, with a specific look at how recent activities have been organized and how they sustain themselves as ongoing criminal concerns. The ‘piracy enterprise’ consists of several elements, including recruitment of people, finance, intelligence and knowledge of the maritime space, shipping patterns, and the vulnerabilities of targets, as well as tactics and operations, internal organization, connections to the local communities, and the creation of ‘safe havens’ ashore. Piracy in Somalia has evolved from the simple model of coastal residents accosting fishing vessels in Somali waters and extorting payments at gunpoint, to complex criminal pirate groups staging and deploying multiple action groups to seize large commercial ships far out at sea, seize them, take them back to a safe home port, and hold them for months for negotiated ransoms. This paper looks at how the current enterprise is structured and its evolution from humble beginnings. Across the continent, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea are engaged in what can best be described as a crime wave of 'robbery at sea' attacks. A small number of recent attempted attacks have mimicked the more sophisticated tries on commercial vessels and tankers, but the mainstay of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has been ‘smash and grab’ night strikes on ships at anchor or oil platforms. While this is a different type of piracy/robbery, using the enterprise model reveals much about how it works, why it has not evolved like in Somalia, and what vulnerabilities it has. Details: Alexandria, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2011. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2011 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/OTA%20Piracy%20Enterprises%20in%20Africa%20D0023394%20A2.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/OTA%20Piracy%20Enterprises%20in%20Africa%20D0023394%20A2.pdf Shelf Number: 122783 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Africa) |
Author: Whiteneck, Daniel Title: The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake? Summary: For the past 60 years, since roughly the outbreak of the Korean War and the U.S. response to that war, the Navy has had a consistent strategy for the structure, deployment, and posturing of the fleet. American maritime dominance has been based on forces that were deployed forward and always ready to respond quickly to emerging situations in areas of vital interest to American foreign policy. Because of the perceived need to be able to respond at the highest levels of warfare throughout the Cold War, those forces were built, trained, and equipped to be “combat credible” against capable challengers. “Combat credible” meant the ability to project power against advanced air defenses, conduct and enable littoral/amphibious operations in opposed environments, and establish blue-water dominance against highly capable surface, sub-surface, and air threats. In the post-Cold War environment, and since 9/11, evidence illustrates that the demand signal for naval forces has not waned. In fact, the Navy continues to be tasked with a range of operations, from disaster response to peacetime engagement and shows of force, and from counter-piracy and maritime interdiction to participation in major combat operations by TACAIR and other power-projection forces. This demand signal did not go down during the 1990s (“reaping the peace dividend”) as the Navy took on persistent operations in the Balkans, the Caribbean, and the Arabian Gulf after Desert Storm, continued its role in Asia, and expanded its peacetime engagement as COCOMs increased “shaping” activities. After 9/11, the Navy shed its role in the Balkans and the Caribbean but increased its homeland defense role and its ballistic missile defense missions, and it has played a major part in strike operations for OIF and OEF for the past decade. The Navy also picked up significant roles in humanitarian assistance, maritime partnership building, littoral combat, and special operational forces (SOF), and routinely had over 10,000 sailors ashore in CENTCOM to support operations there. If the Navy hoped that reductions in the demand signal would give it breathing room to reset the force and invest in platforms and assets at the expense of operations, its hopes have proved to be false. The Navy battle force has shrunk by 20 percent in the last decade, while the number of ships on deployment has remained relatively steady. In a period of constant demand, resources to meet those demands, pay for needed future structure, and meet growing demands for spending on people and health care have shrunk. They will not grow in the future. There is a gap that must be addressed. Details: Alexandria, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2010. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2011 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/The%20Navy%20at%20a%20Tipping%20Point%20D0022262.A3.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/The%20Navy%20at%20a%20Tipping%20Point%20D0022262.A3.pdf Shelf Number: 122787 Keywords: Homeland SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/PiracyU.S. Navy |
Author: Conley, Christopher J. Title: Interdicting Maritime Migrant Smuggling: Applying Some Concepts of Operational Art to Coast Guard Operations Summary: The issue of illegal human trafficking, smuggling, and migration in the maritime domain presents a challenge to the organizations charged with protecting the borders of the United States. As an agency responsible for enforcing laws on the high seas, the U.S. Coast Guard is the primary instrument for interdicting illegal maritime migration. Except in extreme circumstances of mass migration, the Coast Guard has relied on the principle of effective presence to accomplish its mission and done so with measurable success. However, with the growing transnational criminal nature of human trafficking and increased pressure on U.S. maritime borders due to tougher border enforcement, the Coast Guard should seek to expand its concept of operations for interdiction of human smuggling in the maritime domain. The Coast Guard could do this by inviting relevant agencies to participate in a Joint Interagency Task Force to bring a unified effort to counter maritime smuggling. Furthermore, the Coast Guard should apply the appropriate concepts of operational art consistent with joint doctrine in planning and executing its mission to ensure the most effective and efficient application of national resources. Details: Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2008. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2011 at: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada484333.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada484333.pdf Shelf Number: 123003 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingIllegal AliensMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityMigrantsU.S. Coast Guard |
Author: Gunther, Michael J. Title: A Cooperative Strategy of 21st Century Seapower: 200 Years of Repressing Piracy and Still Missing the Boat Summary: Piracy on the high seas is increasing. This is especially true for the waters off the African coast, which are some of the most dangerous in the world. The violence and negative economic aspects of piracy present challenges to international security and stability, especially for African coastal nations. Repressing piracy is a complicated process that requires coordination and cooperation among national and international military and nonmilitary agencies. Joint Interdiction Planning and Homeland Defense Doctrine address piracy repression but fail to provide adequate guidance and processes to successfully complete the operation. The only threat response plan that could be used to address acts of piracy is the national-level Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan. To succeed at repressing piracy around Africa, the regional Geographic Combatant Commander must build a regional command and control structure capable of executing all phases of piracy repression, advocate the development of new joint doctrine, and promote implementation of regional interagency threat response plans. This paper will analyze the abilities of U.S. maritime forces to successfully create and maintain security on the high seas around Africa from piracy as outlined in "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower." The analysis examines strategic guidance provided in the "National Strategy for Maritime Security," evaluates the law of the sea, assesses threat response plans, and analyzes AFRICOM's role. Finally, the paper concludes that improvements are required to the existing process to successfully combat piracy around Africa. Details: Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2008. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2011 at: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada484354.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Africa URL: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada484354.pdf Shelf Number: 123004 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/Pirates |
Author: Szelp, Attila Title: Cargo Security Initiatives in the EU and the USA, their Impact on Business Operations and Mutual Recognition with Focus on AEO and C-TPAT Summary: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a tremendous impact on international trade policy. The USA was the first country to introduce cargo security and facilitation measures as a counteraction. The EU and international organizations also established new security programs in order to better secure cargo movements across borders. This thesis gives an overview of security initiatives introduced by international organizations, the EU and the USA, with an emphasis on the trade facilitation programs Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) and Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and a comparison of them. The process towards mutual recognition of these programs is then described. Three case studies put the topic under the microscope: The perception as well as actual benefits and disadvantages from economic actors' points of view are presented and implementation and operational processes in companies are demonstrated. The case studies include port authorities, carriers and logistics providers. Finally, the author reflects on his findings. Details: Vienna: WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Institut für Transportwirtschaft und Logistik, 2010. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 21, 2011 at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/3013/1/Szelp.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://epub.wu.ac.at/3013/1/Szelp.pdf Shelf Number: 123074 Keywords: Cargo SecurityCargo TheftMaritime SecurityStolen GoodsStolen PropertyTerrorism |
Author: Liss, Carolin Title: Privatising the Fight Against Somali Pirates Summary: The recent audacious pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and off the horn of Africa have fuelled the debate about the privatisation of maritime security. Ship owners and maritime security experts, as well as representatives of industry organisations, have stated that private security companies may be able to ensure safe passage for vessels through these pirate infested waters, a task at which government agencies have failed, despite international efforts. In fact, with more than 35 hijacked vessels this year, the first hijacking of a super tanker, attacks on UN aid ships and the unprecedented payment of millions of US dollars ransom for kidnapped crew and hijacked vessels, the arguments for hiring PSCs are strong. However, the employment of PSCs in Iraq and other places around the world has clearly shown that there are problems associated with the services provided by PSCs and the regulation of such companies in conflict zones. This paper explores the risks and benefits of employing PSCs to secure shipping in the Gulf of Aden and the horn of Africa. Details: Perth, Western Australia: Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 2008. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 152: Accessed October 21, 2011 at: http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/publications/wp/wp152.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Somalia URL: http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/publications/wp/wp152.pdf Shelf Number: 123078 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Somalia)Private SecurityPrivatization |
Author: Giampaolo, Amanda Title: Changes in Maritime Practice as a Result of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden Summary: Piracy off the coast of Somalia, particularly in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, is a growing problem for shipping companies whose vessels frequently travel through this area to transport goods. The International Chamber of Commerce's [ICC] Commercial Crime Service [CCS] has declared this area “piracy prone”. According to The Journal of Navigation 2010 report entitled, “Piracy at Sea: Somalia an Area of Great Concern”, piracy emerged off the coast of Somalia following the collapse of the Said Barre government in 1991. However, piracy in the Gulf of Aden did not generate much alarm until 2005 when the number of incidences in a year exceeded 35 for the first time, says report author Santiago Iglesias Baniela. This was followed by a brief decline in recorded piracy in 2006, which Baniela links to the short lived governance by the Islamic Courts Union [ICU] in Somalia. The report further notes that the piracy problem grew exponentially in 2008, leading to great international concern and the formation of three international task forces: [i] the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's [NATO] counterpiracy initiatives: Operation Allied Provider [October – December 2008], Operation Allied Protector [March 2009 – August 2009], and Operation Ocean Shield [August 2009 to present]; [ii] the European Union Naval Force Somalia [EU NAVFOR] Operation Atalanta [launched in response to UN Resolutions in 2008-2009]; and [iii] the Combined Maritime Force's [CMF] Combined Taskforce 151 [CTF 151], which was created in January 2009. Despite these initial efforts, piracy continues to be a major threat to the shipping industry, explains Martin Murphy author of “Somalia: the New Barbary”. This paper provides an overview of changes in maritime practice as a result of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Rerouting of vessels, group transits and the use of private security are discussed in more detail. Details: NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 2011. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20Anti-Piracy%20Thematic%20Papers/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Maritime_Changes_Sep_2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Somalia URL: https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20Anti-Piracy%20Thematic%20Papers/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Maritime_Changes_Sep_2011.pdf Shelf Number: 123302 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Somalia)Private Security |
Author: McKinnon, Alexander Title: Maritime Piracy: A Hong Kong Perspective Summary: The threat of piracy is a major concern of Hong Kong maritime industry groups, shipowners, ship operators and the wider sector supporting the shipping industry. The statistics are confronting: in Somalia at present, at least 23 vessels are being held against the will of the owners and at least 518 hostages (mostly seafarers) are at the whim of Somali pirates. Even more troubling is that the first quarter of 2011 has been labelled as the worst on official record. Almost three times the number of attacks occurred as compared to the same quarter in 2010. Piracy is also an ever-present danger in the waters of South East Asia although regional efforts have yielded positive results. The Marine Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), which is responsible for port administration and the Hong Kong Shipping Register, is active in promoting security arrangements to Hong Kong registered ships. Notwithstanding this, Hong Kong vessels continue to be at risk and limitations imposed by international conventions frustrate those closely involved in the industry. This paper looks at the approaches taken by Hong Kong in attempting to protect its ships from piracy. The paper also briefly canvasses the international legal framework and highlights some controversial and emerging issues. Details: Hong Kong: Hong Kong Centre for Maritime and Transportation Law, School of Law City University of Hong Kong, 2011. 16p. Source: Working Paper Series. Internet Resource: Accessed on January 23, 2012 at http://www.cityu.edu.hk/slw/HKCMT/Doc/Working_Paper_-_Piracy_-_Final_(v3).pdf Year: 2011 Country: Hong Kong URL: http://www.cityu.edu.hk/slw/HKCMT/Doc/Working_Paper_-_Piracy_-_Final_(v3).pdf Shelf Number: 123755 Keywords: Maritime SecurityPiracy (Hong Kong)Shipping, Security Measures |
Author: Rinehard, Britta Title: Armed Guards on Merchant Vessels Summary: The threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia, as well as in the Gulf of Aden (GoA), Horn of Africa (HoA) and the Indian Ocean has sparked a new discussion on the use of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board merchant vessels to prevent pirates from successfully boarding and hijacking a vessel. Vessels with low freeboard and/ or low speed are more vulnerable to pirate attacks. Therefore hiring armed guards on these vulnerable vessels are more likely. However, employing private armed guards to protect commercial vessels traveling through pirate-prone waters is controversial for a number of reasons, such as legal issues, safety concerns for seafarers and varying national regulations. This paper will provide a brief overview of the on-going debate over the use of PCASPs as well as recent movements related to this matter. Details: Norfolk, VA: Civil-Military Fusion Centre (www.cimicweb.org), 2011. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 26, 2012 at https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20Anti-Piracy%20Thematic%20Papers/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Armed%20Guards%20October%202011_Final_rmb.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20Anti-Piracy%20Thematic%20Papers/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Armed%20Guards%20October%202011_Final_rmb.pdf Shelf Number: 123774 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPrivate SecuritySecurity GuardsTransnational Crime |
Author: Chambers, Matthew Title: International Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Hindering Maritime Trade and Water Transportation Around the World Summary: Over the 11-year period, 1998-2008, more than 3,600 acts of international piracy and armed robbery at sea have occurred. Figure 1 clearly shows that piracy affects all corners of the globe—from the Caribbean, to the Mediterranean, to the South China Sea. In 2008, East Africa accounted for the greatest number of incidents with 134, followed by the South China Sea (72 incidents) and West Africa (50 incidents). Table 1 shows the overall number of attacks has been on the decline in many parts of the world with acts of piracy occurring at a rate of about 25 per month in 2008, down from a peak of nearly 40 incidents per month in 2000. This decline was global in nature with one notable exception—the waters surrounding East Africa (e.g., Gulf of Aden, Red Sea) saw a 123 percent (74-incident) increase from the prior year. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2010. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 6, 2012 at: http://www.bts.gov/publications/special_reports_and_issue_briefs/special_report/2010_04_22/html/entire.html Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.bts.gov/publications/special_reports_and_issue_briefs/special_report/2010_04_22/html/entire.html Shelf Number: 123990 Keywords: Armed Robbery, ShipsMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy |
Author: Australia. Office of the Inspector of Transport Security Title: International Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Security Inquiry Report Summary: This Inquiry was conducted pursuant to a direction issued on 2 February 2009, in accordance with subsection 11(1) of the Inspector of Transport Security Act 2006 (the Act), to inquire into International Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, as a relevant transport security matter within the terms of the Act. The direction was given by the Federal Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, the Honourable Anthony Albanese MP, and arose from a concern to ensure that the Australian Government had an accurate understanding of the prevailing international piracy and robbery at sea environment and the potential implications for Australian-related shipping trade. While the primary focus of the Inquiry was the threat of piracy to Australia and Australian shipping and crews, it included an international benchmarking assessment of the global piracy and armed robbery at sea situation. Before the late 1990s, the most sophisticated of pirate attack profiles involved the seizing of a ship to steal its cargo for future resale. In many cases it involved the re-birthing of a ship, often called ‘a phantom ship’, under another name and registry. In these attacks the pirates sometimes confined the crew for a time and then set them adrift; on other occasions they are believed to have murdered their victims. Since the 1990s, however, hijack and ransom has become the pirate modus operandi causing most international concern, with the Gulf of Aden and West Indian Ocean region recognised as the epicentre of the contemporary global piracy problem. Significant incidents of piracy are increasingly occurring in the Gulf of Guinea area of West Africa, centring on Nigeria. Other areas of continuing concern are the waters of the Indian subcontinent, Central America, the South China Sea and the Caribbean Sea. Details: Canberra: Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, 2010. 94p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 6, 2012 at: http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/oits/files/IPARS_SecurityInquiryReport.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/oits/files/IPARS_SecurityInquiryReport.pdf Shelf Number: 123991 Keywords: Armed Robbery, ShipsMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy |
Author: Oceans Beyond Piracy, One Earth Future Foundation Title: The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011 Summary: This report is One Earth Future Foundation’s (OEF) second assessment of the Economic Cost of Piracy. It estimates that Somali piracy cost between $6.6 and $6.9 billion in 2011. Our previous report on the Economic Cost of Piracy in 2010, estimated that piracy cost the world $7 - $12 billion. That initial report generated a significant amount of dialogue and feedback on the cost of piracy. This report is the result of extensive research conducted by OEF with the collaborative participation of multiple different stakeholders, and includes significant contributions made by commentators, experts, and others impacted by piracy. It assesses nine different direct cost factors, and is focused specifically on the economic impact of Somali piracy. While the report assesses the cost of piracy for the year of 2011, there were significant changes and developments in piracy throughout that year, and in many ways 2011 was the ‘tale of two years’: Overall, 2011 saw an increase in attacks by Somali pirates. This was driven by a rapid escalation in the number of hostages and hijackings in the first quarter of 2011. As expected, hijackings declined during the monsoon period. But in the last quarter of the year, the anticipated resurgence of piracy following the monsoon period did not eventuate. A number of factors may explain this pattern, including an extended period of monsoonal rough weather off the coast of Somalia, and the use of deterrence mechanisms such as private armed security. Other developing trends throughout the year included an altered re-routing model where ships transited close to the western Indian coastline (rather than around the Cape of Good Hope); and pirates’ changing use of mother ships from large vessels to smaller fishing boats. Further, 2011 saw a more aggressive response from military forces conducting counter-piracy missions in the region. The project finds that of the total costs of Somali piracy in 2011, the shipping industry bore over 80% of these costs, or between $5.3 and $5.5 billion. Details: Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2011. 62p. Source: Working Paper, One Earth Foundation: Internet Resource: Accessed February 10, 2012 at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf Shelf Number: 124078 Keywords: Costs of CrimeMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy (Somalia)Transportation Security |
Author: Mejia Jr., Maximo Q. Title: Piracy in shipping Summary: Piracy in its various forms has posed a threat to trade and shipping for millennia. In the 1970s, a steady rise in the number of attacks ushered in the present phenomenon of modern piracy and not many parts of the world’s seas are free from piracy in one form or another today. This paper reviews the historical and geographical developments of piracy in shipping, with a discussion on contentious issues involved in defining piracy. Using data available on piracy acts collected from the IMB related to 3,957 attacks that took place between 1996 and 2008, we shed light on recent changes in geography and modi operandi of acts of piracy and investigate how poverty and political instability may be seen as the root causes of piracy. Details: France: Laboratoire d'Economie et de Management Nantes-Atlantique, Université de Nantes, 2010. 34p. Source: Lemna EA 4272 Working Paper: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2012 at http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/47/06/16/PDF/LEMNA_WP_201014.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/47/06/16/PDF/LEMNA_WP_201014.pdf Shelf Number: 124085 Keywords: Maritime SecurityPiracyShipping, Security Measures |
Author: United States Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Progress Made, but Further Actions Needed to Secure the Maritime Energy Supply Summary: The nation's economy and security are heavily dependent on oil, natural gas, and other energy commodities. Al-Qa'ida and other groups with malevolent intent have targeted energy tankers and offshore energy infrastructure because of their importance to the nation's economy and national security. The U.S. Coast Guard--a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is the lead federal agency for maritime security, including the security of energy tankers and offshore energy infrastructure. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also has responsibilities for preventing and responding to terrorist incidents. This testimony discusses the extent to which (1) the Coast Guard and the FBI have taken actions to address GAO's prior recommendations to prevent and respond to a terrorist incident involving energy tankers and (2) the Coast Guard has taken actions to assess the security risks to offshore energy infrastructure and related challenges. This testimony is based on products issued from December 2007 through March 2011 and recently completed work on the Coast Guard's actions to assess security risks. GAO reviewed documents from the Coast Guard's risk model and relevant laws, regulations, policies, and procedures; and interviewed Coast Guard officials. The Coast Guard and the FBI have made progress implementing prior recommendations GAO made to enhance energy tanker security. In 2007, GAO made five recommendations to address challenges in ensuring the effectiveness of federal agencies' actions to protect energy tankers and implement response plans. The Coast Guard and the FBI have implemented two recommendations, specifically: (1) the Coast Guard, in coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, developed protocols for facilitating the recovery and resumption of trade following a disruption to the maritime transportation system, and (2) the Coast Guard and the FBI participated in local port exercises that executed multiple response plans simultaneously. The Coast Guard has made progress on a third recommendation through work on a national strategy for the security of certain dangerous cargoes. It also plans to develop a resource allocation plan, starting in April 2012, which may help address the need to balance security responsibilities. However, the Coast Guard and the FBI have not yet taken action on a fourth recommendation to develop an operational plan to integrate the national spill and terrorism response plans. According to DHS, it plans to revise the National Response Framework, but no decision has been made regarding whether the separate response plans will be integrated. Also, DHS has not yet taken action on the final recommendation to develop explicit performance measures for emergency response capabilities and use them in risk-based analyses to set priorities for acquiring needed response resources. According to DHS, it is revising its emergency response grant programs, but does not have specific plans to develop performance measures as part of this effort. The Coast Guard has taken actions to assess the security risks to offshore energy infrastructure, which includes Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) facilities (facilities that are involved in producing oil or natural gas) and deepwater ports (facilities used to transfer oil and natural gas from tankers to shore), but improvements are needed. The Coast Guard has used its Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) to examine the security risks to OCS facilities and deepwater ports. To do so, the Coast Guard has coordinated with the intelligence community and stakeholders, such as the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement. However, the Coast Guard faces complex and technical challenges in assessing risks. For example, the Coast Guard does not have data on the ability of an OCS facility to withstand an attack. The Coast Guard generally recognizes these challenges and has actions underway to study or address them. Further, GAO determined that as of May 2011, the Coast Guard had not assessed security risks for 12 of the 50 security-regulated OCS facilities that are to be subjected to such assessments. Coast Guard officials later determined that they needed to add these OCS facilities to MSRAM for assessment and have completed the required assessments. However, while the list of security-regulated facilities may change each year based on factors such as production volume, the Coast Guard's current policies and procedures do not call for Coast Guard officials to provide an annual updated list of regulated OCS facilities to MSRAM analysts. Given the continuing threat to such offshore facilities, revising its procedures could help ensure that the Coast Guard carries out its risk assessment requirements for security-regulated OCS facilities. GAO is recommending that the Coast Guard revise policies and procedures to ensure its analysts receive the annual updated list of regulated offshore energy facilities to ensure risk assessments are conducted on those facilities. The Coast Guard concurred with this recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2011. 28p. Source: GAO Report GAO-11-883T: Internet Resource: Accessed February 17, 2012 at http://gao.gov/assets/130/126837.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://gao.gov/assets/130/126837.pdf Shelf Number: 124153 Keywords: Energy InfrastructureMaritime Security |
Author: Kontorovich, Eugene Title: Equipment Articles for the Prosecution of Maritime Piracy Summary: This paper will discuss how the adoption into treaty or municipal law of equipment articles could facilitate the prosecution of piracy. Equipment articles are rules that create a judicial presumption of guilt on piracy charges for the crews of civilian vessels possessing certain specified equipment within a certain defined area of the high seas plagued by pirate attacks. For example, equipment articles could create a presumption of pircay for people found on a vessel less than a certain length, with engines of a certain horsepower, equipped with grappling hooks, boarding ladders, armed with RPGs and/or heavy machine guns, and/or far out at sea with obviously inadequate stores of food and water (which could suggest the skiff operates from a mothership). The presence of all or some of these things would only be relevant to a finding of piracy for vessels within a predefined exclusion zone in the Gulf of Aden or Indian Ocean - not for the whole world. Such laws were crucial to the prosecution and suppression of the transatlantic slave trade in the 19th century, perhaps the greatest example of international legal cooperation before World War I. Equipment articles could help make the current naval cooperation in the suppression of piracy translate to an end of legal impunity. The promulgation of equipment articles could bolster the other principal legal anti-piracy policies under discussion. Such rules could be used in trials in national courts, regional tribunals, or specially created international courts. By lowering the cost of prosecution, equipment articles would encourage a broader range of countries, from India to the U.S., to prosecute pirates. This could reduce the human rights concerns surrounding such trials. A major advantage of the equipment articles is that they are a relatively low-cost and quick solution, compared to more long-term fixes like creating new international tribunals or stabilizing Somalia. After the idea was first mentioned in a briefing paper from the One Earth Future Foundation, United States Department officials have already expressed some interest. Part I of this discussion paper describes the use of equipment articles by numerous countries in the 19th century to bring slave traders to justice. Part II discusses modern treaties and municipal laws that take a similar approach to hish seas crimes by using vessel configuration or cargo as a proxy for hard-to prove criminal intent. Part III briefly considers the manner in which equipment articles can be promulgated, such as national legislation, treaty, or Security Council resolution, and concerns about establishing a criminal intent. Details: Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, 2010. 10p. Source: Dicussion Paper: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2012 at http://www.oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/EQUIPMENT%20ARTICLES%20FOR%20THE%20PROSECUTION%20OF%20MARITIME%20PIRACY.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/EQUIPMENT%20ARTICLES%20FOR%20THE%20PROSECUTION%20OF%20MARITIME%20PIRACY.pdf Shelf Number: 124143 Keywords: International CooperationInternational Law Enforcement CooperationMaritime SecurityPiracyProsection |
Author: Goslin, Charles Title: Maritime and Port Security: White Paper Summary: Worldwide Port and Maritime operations and their associated facilities and infrastructure collectively represent one of the single greatest unaddressed challenges to the security of nations and the global economy today. The reason that ports and shipping activity are so difficult to secure lies primarily in their topography. Ports are typically large, asymmetrical activities dispersed over hundreds of acres of land and water so that they can simultaneously accommodate ship, truck and rail traffic, petroleum product/liquid offload, storage or piping, and container storage. The movement of freight, cargo (solid or liquid), and transport through a port is generally on a “queuing” system, meaning that any delay snarls all operations1. Whether or not delays are related to security, security generally falls by the wayside in the interest of time management or convenience. Globally, there are very few uniform standards for point-to-point control of security on containers, cargoes, vessels or crews - a port’s security in one nation remains very much at the mercy of a port’s security, or lack thereof, in another nation. Organized crime is entrenched in many ports, and a large majority of them still do not require background checks on dock workers, crane operators or warehouse employees. Most ports lease large portions of their facility to private terminal operating companies, who are responsible for their own security. The result of this is a “balkanized”, uneven system of port security and operations management as a whole. In spite of awareness by public policymakers that ports remain critically vulnerable, funding and government-led efforts to harden port facilities worldwide is moving at a glacial pace. Terrorists, in particular, are aware of this unaddressed vulnerability. As outlined below, the threats to the maritime industry are very real. Unfortunately, the question of whether terrorists will act to exploit the weaknesses in port facilities is, unfortunately, not a matter of “if” they will, but “when” they will. Details: Jacksonville, FL: duostechnologies International, 2008 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 2, 2012 at: http://www.duostechnologies.com/DownloadCenter/WP-MaritimeAndPortSecurity.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.duostechnologies.com/DownloadCenter/WP-MaritimeAndPortSecurity.pdf Shelf Number: 124796 Keywords: Cargo SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPort SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Metaparti, Satya Prakash Title: Risk Management Initiatives for Post 9/11 Maritime Security Summary: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, there has been a major worldwide focus on the threat of terrorism to trade, transportation and critical infrastructures. One area that has received particular attention is maritime trade and international shipping. The relative vulnerability of ports, ships, containers, and other maritime facilities worldwide combined with the importance of maritime trade to the global economy have resulted in several international and national measures to manage security risks in this area. Among these, the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code by the United Nations, and domestic legislations of the United States such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) have an international effect and are of particular significance. Despite the emergence of strong security responses, concerns about their adequacy and cost-effectiveness remain. Differing threat perceptions and erosion of sovereignty also impede effective implementation of these security measures. Based on these perceptions, this study questions whether the post 9/11 maritime security measures resulted from a sound application of the principles of risk management or were excessively politicized. This study also examines in detail the intrinsic factors within the shipping industry that contribute to its vulnerability or resilience, the underlying dynamics security responses, as well as their cost and effectiveness. Gaps in the effectiveness of these security measures are identified and possible remedial measures are suggested. This multidisciplinary study is based on the concepts of securitization from the political science domain and risk management principles from business studies, and is an attempt at reaching across disciplines to examine this important topic of contemporary interest. Qualitative inputs for this study were obtained through interviews with seafarers, industry experts and government/port officials and quantitatively backed by a user perception survey on the ISPS Code. Findings indicate that post 9/11 maritime security measures have enhanced the overall security of shipping. However, large gaps remain. Further, at a strategic level, there are differences among various stakeholders with regards to threat perceptions and the cost effectiveness of security. At an operational level, the study findings show excessive reliance on paper work, bureaucratization and restrictions on movement of goods and personnel. Recommendations at a strategic level include wider international cooperation and a decision making process that aims for broader consensus among all stakeholders. At a tactical/operational level, this study recommends better information sharing, reduced paperwork and integration of various shipboard sub-processes, such as those for safety, environment, quality, and security - which are currently separate - into a unified process that optimizes the available resources and reduces conflicting requirements. Details: Hong Kong: Hong Kong University, 2009. 334p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2012 at: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/56504 Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/56504 Shelf Number: 125344 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityRisk AssessmentTerrorism |
Author: Rabasa, Angel Title: Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Tri-Border Area of Southeast Asia: The Coast Watch System of the Philippines Summary: The tri-border area (TBA) between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia has been identified as a key hub of terrorist and related criminal activity in Southeast Asia. This geographical space is a well-known transit zone for weapons, explosives, and personnel, as well as a principal logistical corridor for local and transnational terrorist groups. The U.S. government has devoted considerable resources to promoting maritime security initiatives in this region and, through a variety of capacity-building efforts, has been at the forefront of underwriting initiatives in each of the three countries. This approach has necessarily been country-specific, with an eye toward developing solutions that uniquely fit each nation. However, the ultimate goal has been to encourage cooperation and interoperability, both among the recipient states and with the United States. One of the most interesting collaborative initiatives is the evolving Coast Watch System (CWS) in the Philippines. Originally designed to improve maritime domain awareness in the Sulu and Celebes Seas, the concept has now been extended to cover the entire Philippine archipelago. This occasional paper analyzes the security environment in the TBA; evaluates the CWS and the challenges it has yet to overcome; and considers the prospects for an initiative to eventually form the basis of an integrated system of maritime security that would tie together the three states that converge in the TBA—Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The main purpose of this document is to act as a building block to guide further work on how best to establish an effective and viable system of regional maritime security architecture in this sensitive but understudied part of the world. Further analysis on maritime domain awareness (MDA) efforts by Malaysia and Indonesia would usefully complement this study. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 5, 2012 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP372.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Philippines URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP372.pdf Shelf Number: 125481 Keywords: Maritime Crime (Philippines)Maritime SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Bekkevold, Jo Inge Title: Anti-Piracy and Humanitarian Operations Summary: Given the last decade's maritime cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations after the 2004 tsunami and the 2011 earth quake and tsunami in Japan, and the last years' anti-piracy efforts off-Somalia and elsewhere, the first workshop on “Anti-Piracy and Humanitarian Operations” was a timely and important event. The first paper by a team of Norwegian scholars and naval officers assesses Norway’s contribution to multilateral anti-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean and Somalia. The paper by Bernard Cole, professor at the US National War College, is an analysis of several recent US HADR operations in the Asia-Pacific region. Sarabjeet Singh Parmar, research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, discusses the importance of HADR operations in India’s National Strategy. The last paper by Øystein Tunsjø, associate professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, adresses the impact of recent and future maritime developments in Asia on Norwegian security. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2012. 79p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 9, 2012 at: http://ifs.forsvaret.no/publikasjoner/IOS/Sider/IOS_1_2012.aspx Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://ifs.forsvaret.no/publikasjoner/IOS/Sider/IOS_1_2012.aspx Shelf Number: 125512 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/Pirates |
Author: Charlton, Alexandra Title: The Challenges to Responding to Human Smuggling in Canada: Practitioners Reflect on the 1999 Boat Arrivals in British Columbia Summary: During the summer of 1999, four boats arrived off the west coast of British Columbia (BC) carrying a total of 599 migrants smuggled directly from Fujian, China. After their arrival, most of the migrants made refugee claims. Once the first group of migrants had been processed and released, many disappeared, thus abandoning their refugee claims. In response, the federal government detained most of the migrants who arrived on the following three boats. Because of the scale of the boat arrivals and the decision to detain refugee claimants, Canadian governmental and non-governmental institutions faced unprecedented challenges in responding to this migration. Many of these challenges involved collaboration and resource sharing among institutions. While other federal departments and other levels of government were involved, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) held primary responsibility, with its mandate to facilitate immigration and to enforce international borders in relation to human migration. This paper is a collective contribution made by seven people – with distinct perspectives – involved in the response to human smuggling in BC in 1999. They convened at a workshop held at the Fifth National Metropolis Conference in Ottawa on 20 October 2001 with the goal of furthering the dialogue about the cross-institutional response to human smuggling. The objective of this paper is to continue the dialogue about the many challenges to responding to human smuggling in Canada, as outlined by speakers. Speakers were asked to address the following questions: (1) What is the framework within which you work (e.g., the mandate and culture of your institution)? (2) What are your roles and responsibilities in responding to human smuggling? (3) What have been the main challenges in the cross-institutional coordination of the response? Details: Vancouver: Vancouver Centre of Excellence, 2002. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis Working Paper Series, No. 02-23: Accessed August 28, 2012 at: http://mbc.metropolis.net/assets/uploads/files/wp/2002/WP02-23.pdf Year: 2002 Country: Canada URL: http://mbc.metropolis.net/assets/uploads/files/wp/2002/WP02-23.pdf Shelf Number: 126155 Keywords: Human Smuggling (Canada)Human TraffickingIllegal ImmigrantsMaritime CrimeMaritime Security |
Author: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Title: Calming Troubled Waters: Global and Regional Strategies for Countering Piracy Summary: Last October the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy co-chaired a forum on piracy in the margins of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Perth, attended by Indian Ocean Rim countries and stakeholders promoting security in Somalia and off the Horn of Africa. The Australian Government at that time agreed to host a Counter-Piracy Conference in Perth this year designed to explore further options to reduce piracy in Somalia and beyond. This Conference was held on 16–17 July 2012. It was attended by delegates from 59 countries and organisations and chaired by Mr Peter Jennings, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The Conference addressed global issues with piracy and armed robbery against ships. It compared the situation in the three main areas where these crimes are most prolific—in Southeast Asia, off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Guinea—with a view towards gaining ideas about the lessons to be learned and how the fight against piracy and sea robbery might be strengthened at the national, regional and international levels. This Special Report opens with the speech presented by Warren Snowdon, Minister for Defence Science and Personnel, on behalf of Stephen Smith, Australian Minister for Defence to the Perth Counter-Piracy Conference. The report sets out a background paper prepared for the Conference by Dr Sam Bateman, Maritime Security Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, who was assisted in this task by ASPI’s Deputy Director, Dr Anthony Bergin. The report concludes with some personal reflections on the Perth international meeting by the Chairman of the Counter-Piracy Conference, as well as the final Chairman’s Statement, issued immediately following the conclusion of the Conference. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institiute, 2012. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report -- Issue 47; Accessed September 17, 2012 at: http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=347&pubtype=10 Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=347&pubtype=10 Shelf Number: 126362 Keywords: Armed RobberyMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiates/Piracy |
Author: Onuoha, Freedom C. Title: Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Nigeria as Microcosm Summary: The resurgence of pirate attacks in African waters is now a subject of serious concern to African states and indeed the international community. For the last decade, piracy in African waters is concentrated in three main regions, namely the Somali coast/the Gulf of Aden along the East African Coast; Nigeria’s territorial waters in West Africa; and the Mozambique Channel/Cape sea route in Southern Africa. Since 2007 when African waters overtook waters off Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Philippines – as the traditionally dangerous hotspots of global piracy, much of the international attention and efforts at countering piracy in Africa have been on Somali maritime piracy. This is understandably so, because piracy off the Somali coast accounts for more than half of pirate attacks recorded annually in Africa, if not globally. For instance, there were 439 piracy attacks worldwide in 2011, more than half of which were attributed to Somali pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and off the coast of Oman (Alessi, 2012). The spike in attacks prompted the deployment in 2008 of an ongoing international coalition of navies to fight Somali piracy. Yet violence at sea is also brewing in another African gulf: the Gulf of Guinea (GG). The increase in the number of attacks in 2011 in the GG and the fear that this would further increase in 2012 have prompted analysts to question whether foreign 3 navies will intervene to shore up maritime security in the region as they did in waters off the coast of Somalia (Baldauf, 2012). It is in this light that this article examines the dynamics of piracy in the GG region by highlighting, the trend in piracy in the region, contributing factors underlying the scourge, implications of piracy for the region and efforts being made to suppress violence at sea in the region. Details: Doha, Qatar: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2012. 12p Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 1, 2012 at http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/6/12/201261294647291734Piracy%20and%20Maritime%20Security%20in%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Guinea.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Nigeria URL: http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/6/12/201261294647291734Piracy%20and%20Maritime%20Security%20in%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Guinea.pdf Shelf Number: 126543 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracyPirates/Piracy |
Author: Brown, James Title: Pirates and Privateers: Managing the Indian Ocean's Private Security Book Summary: The fight against Somali-based pirates is becoming a private battle as global defence cuts reduce naval counter-piracy deployments. Because governments have struggled to contain the spread of piracy in the Indian Ocean, shipping companies have turned to private military security companies to guarantee the safety of their crews and cargo. Private armed teams have proliferated on commercial shipping and several private armed vessels are operating in the region. Meanwhile, some governments are hiring out their own national militaries as security guards onboard ships. However, this private counter-piracy boom is creating fresh problems. Already shootings at sea have led to international disputes and accidental confrontations. And murky legal and consular difficulties loom. There is a legitimate role for private companies in fighting piracy. But the challenge for governments will be to recapture the policy agenda and define the limits of what that role is before it leads to new kinds of trouble on the high seas. Downloadable map showing private counter-piracy forces - attribute to Lowy Institute. Key Findings - The maritime security business in the Indian Ocean is booming as ships turn to private military security companies to help in the fight against piracy. Over 140 companies now provide armed protection for ships in the Indian Ocean. At least 2700 individual contractors are employed as armed guards on ships and 18 floating armouries are operating in waters near the Gulf of Aden. - 40 private armed patrol boats are now, or will soon be, operating in the Indian Ocean. The most sophisticated of these private navies is outfitting three large boats in Singapore - each with a crew of 20, capable of carrying 40 private marines, and equipped with a helicopter and drones. The use of these boats, and the aggressive tactics they employ, should be discouraged by governments and the International Maritime Organization. - Because of shipping company demands for armed teams and shrinking defence budgets, governments are now privately hiring out their soldiers to provide security onboard commercial ships as "vessel protection detachments". The use of these teams potentially has serious legal and political consequences for states should they be involved in disputes. Details: Sydney, NSW: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2012. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2012 at: http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/brown_pirates_and_privateers_web.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Somalia URL: http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/brown_pirates_and_privateers_web.pdf Shelf Number: 126563 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/Pirates (Somalia)Private Security |
Author: Brooke, Sandra Title: Surveillance and Enforcement of Remote Maritime Areas (SERMA): Surveillance Technical Options Summary: Some of the most pristine marine ecosystems remaining on earth are in remote areas far from human population centers, both within national jurisdiction or beyond, on the high seas. Unfortunately even these areas are under pressure from the effects of human activities. Recognizing this, many countries have begun to manage activities in remote maritime areas as well as seeking to conserve areas of high ecological value through the establishment of marine protected areas. In recent years some very large offshore protected areas have been established within national EEZs and in addition some are now also being established on the high seas, through the efforts of several international organizations. Without effective enforcement however, these remote managed areas will remain no more than paper management plans and paper parks. Surveillance and enforcement is more challenging in large, remote areas than for near‐shore MPAs as they are often far from populated land, and therefore difficult to reach with traditional manned patrols, radar or other short‐range monitoring tools. Advanced technologies have been used successfully for surveillance of large areas, and there is great potential for expansion; however an associated response by law enforcement personnel is still essential to confirm and prosecute violations. Combining surveillance technologies into a single enforcement package has considerable cost‐saving potential and is emphasized throughout this report. Additionally, the obvious and targeted presence of law enforcement reduces attempted infractions since there is a perceived significant risk of being caught. This document reviews and evaluates a range of existing technological options for the surveillance of remote marine managed areas. Some of these technologies are currently in use by fisheries management agencies; some are currently the purview of groups like the military or security agencies; and others have hitherto been unexplored for such purposes. As commercial fishing (regulated or otherwise) is the single greatest pressure to most remote marine ecosystems, followed by vessel‐based pollution, we pay particular attention to technologies for the monitoring of such activities. The paper initially discusses surveillance technologies for cooperative vessels; that is, those that are participating in a managed activity where monitoring systems are obligatory. The majority of the paper however describes the range of sensors and platforms that can be applied to the more challenging task of monitoring non‐cooperative vessels. Surveillance technologies alone are insufficient to ensure compliance, but they are a necessary component. This first paper in the series does not look at questions of integrating surveillance technologies into an enforcement regime; neither does it consider issues improving compliance. These are clearly key issues, and we anticipate giving these issues the space they deserve in subsequent publications. Details: Seattle, WA: Marine Conservation Biology Institute, USA, 2010. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2012 at http://www.marine-conservation.org/media/filer_public/2011/09/19/serma_tech-options_v12.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.marine-conservation.org/media/filer_public/2011/09/19/serma_tech-options_v12.pdf Shelf Number: 126691 Keywords: Environmental CrimeMaritime SecurityOffenses Against the EnvironmentSurveillance |
Author: Brooke, Sandra Title: Review of Surveillance and Enforcement of Federal Fisheries in the Southeastern U.S. Summary: Over the past several decades, there has been a significant increase in the number of marine protected areas including those that are remote from shore and cover large areas of the US Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The large size of the areas and the complex assortment of regulations within them pose many challenges to policy-makers and resource managers. One of the greatest challenges is monitoring activity in these areas and enforcing regulations so that the designated areas are truly protecting the resources and are not merely ‘paper parks’. The overarching objective of this project entitled ‘Review of surveillance and enforcement of federal fisheries in the southeastern US’ was to increase the effectiveness of resource protection within the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council (SAFMC) boundaries through identification of potential improvement of monitoring and enforcement. The Marine Conservation Institute, in collaboration with the law enforcement and management agencies within the SAFMC region, has identified surveillance and enforcement challenges and suggests a series of recommendations for addressing some of these problems. Selected recommendations are listed briefly below and are described in more detail in the full report. Details: Seattle, WA: Marine Conservation Biology Institute, 2011. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2012 at http://www.marine-conservation.org/media/filer_public/2012/03/23/safmc_serma_final_report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.marine-conservation.org/media/filer_public/2012/03/23/safmc_serma_final_report.pdf Shelf Number: 126693 Keywords: FisheriesMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityOcean ManagementSurveillanceWildlife Crime |
Author: Kemp, Geoffrey Title: Maritime Security East of Suez: Sustaining the U.S. Role as the Key Policeman in Times of Change Summary: This report examines U.S. power and the strategic environment in the Indian Ocean and South China Seas. This report is organized into three major sections. The first section provides background on how the Indian Ocean became such an important theater. It draws upon a study done for the Center for the National Interest (then known as the Nixon Center) by Justin de Rise, which we are publishing separately. We believe this study, especially the extensive database that supports it, makes a unique contribution to our understanding of the large number of maritime confrontations that have taken places in the Indian Ocean over the last 70 years. It provides a most useful tool for analysts to work with, given the extraordinary amount of data we have assembled and the use of new Google Maps interfaces. The second section focuses on one of our key findings, namely the growing importance of the U.S.-Indian maritime relationship. It includes the summary of a workshop held in New Delhi in February 2011 which drew together American and Indian maritime specialists, and has been published by the Center separately in expanded form under the title Maritime Security Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region. The report concludes with a summary of the emerging maritime environment and the challenges for all Middle Eastern and Asian powers, the United States, and others such as Britain, France, and Australia. Details: Washington, DC: Center for the National Interest, 2012. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 24, 2012 at: http://www.cftni.org/Maritime%20Security%20East%20of%20Suez.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.cftni.org/Maritime%20Security%20East%20of%20Suez.pdf Shelf Number: 126793 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Critical Infrastructure Protection: An Implementation Strategy Could Advance DHS's Coordination of Resilience Efforts across Ports and Other Infrastructure Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is developing a resilience policy, but an implementation strategy is a key next step that could help strengthen DHS resilience efforts. DHS defines resilience as the ability to resist, absorb, recover from, or adapt to adversity, and some high-level documents currently promote resilience as a key national goal. Specifically, two key White House documents emphasize resilience on a national level--the 2011 Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the 2012 National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security. Since 2009, DHS has emphasized the concept of resilience and is currently in the process of developing a resilience policy, the initial steps of which have included creating two internal entities--the Resilience Integration Team and the Office of Resilience Policy (ORP). According to ORP officials, they saw a need to establish a policy that provides component agencies with a single, consistent, department-wide understanding of resilience that clarifies and consolidates resilience concepts from high-level guiding documents, and helps components understand how their activities address DHS's proposed resilience objectives. ORP officials hope to have an approved policy in place later this year. However, DHS officials stated that currently there are no plans to develop an implementation strategy for this policy. An implementation strategy that defines goals, objectives, and activities; identifies resource needs; and lays out milestones is a key step that could help ensure that DHS components adopt the policy consistently and in a timely manner. For example, an implementation strategy with goals and objectives could provide ORP with a more complete picture of how DHS components are implementing this policy. The Coast Guard and the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) work with stakeholders to address some aspects of critical infrastructure resilience, but they could take additional collaborative actions to promote portwide resilience. The Coast Guard is port focused and works with owners and operators of assets, such as vessels and port facilities, to assess and enhance various aspects of critical infrastructure resilience in ports--such as security protection, port recovery, and risk analysis efforts. In contrast, IP, through its Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP), conducts assessments with a broader regional focus, but is not port specific. An RRAP assessment is conducted to assess vulnerability to help improve resilience and allow for an analysis of infrastructure "clusters" and systems in various regions--for example, a regional transportation and energy corridor. The Coast Guard and IP have collaborated on some RRAP assessments, but there may be opportunities for further collaboration to conduct port-focused resilience assessments. For example, IP and the Coast Guard could collaborate to leverage existing expertise and tools--such as the RRAP approach--to develop assessments of the overall resilience of specific port areas. Having relevant agencies collaborate and leverage one another's resources to conduct joint portwide resilience assessments could further all stakeholders' understanding of interdependencies with other port partners, and help determine where to focus scarce resources to enhance resilience for port areas. U.S. ports are part of an economic engine handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually, and a disruption to port operations could have a widespread impact on the global economy. DHS has broad responsibility for protection and resilience of critical infrastructure. Within DHS, the Coast Guard is responsible for the maritime environment, and port safety and security, and IP works to enhance critical infrastructure resilience. Recognizing the importance of the continuity of operations in critical infrastructure sectors, DHS has taken initial steps to emphasize the concept of resilience. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS has provided a road map or plan for guiding resilience efforts, and (2) the Coast Guard and IP are working with port stakeholders and each other to enhance port resilience. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed key legislation and DHS documents and guidance. GAO conducted site visits to three ports, selected based on geography, industries, and potential threats; GAO also interviewed DHS officials and industry stakeholders. Information from site visits cannot be generalized to all ports, but provides insights. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS develop an implementation strategy for its resilience policy and that the Coast Guard and IP identify opportunities to collaborate to leverage existing tools and resources to assess port resilience. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-11: Accessed November 2, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-11 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-11 Shelf Number: 126819 Keywords: Critical Infrastructure ProtectionHomeland SecurityMaritime SecurityPort Security |
Author: Title: Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (II): Southern Africa Summary: The last part of Africa to be decolonised, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, remains one of the most peaceful. Yet, despite comprehensive protocols and agreements, SADC faces acute challenges characterised by tensions between member states, resource deficits, citizens’ exclusion, social discontent and limited internal and external coordination. Regional security cooperation requires adept infrastructures underwritten by political commitment; but the organisation’s Secretariat appears powerless to ensure policy implementation. It must develop an effective common security policy framework, improve coordination with international partners, harmonise and clarify its role with other SADC structures, broaden engagement with civil society, ensure member-state commitment to African Union (AU) efforts on human and people’s rights and build capacity for evaluation and monitoring. As long as national sovereignty prevails over regional interests, however, the success of SADC mechanisms, notably in conflict resolution, will remain limited. The region faces a range of evolving peace and security threats, including maritime security and piracy, cyber and technology-driven security threats, and socio-economic unrest. Beyond efforts to respond to these challenges, policy implementation capacity and information and response mechanisms are urgently required. SADC’s intervention in Madagascar and Zimbabwe has exposed the region’s limited capacity to enforce agreements it has brokered. Ad hoc and under-resourced mediation imposes additional burdens and responsibilities on the mediators. Civil society engagement in SADC processes in the two countries has been at best tangential, confirming the gulf between the regional body and its citizens. The Madagascar and Zimbabwe cases also highlight that structural governance deficits and politicised security sectors exacerbate conflict. SADC’s mediation efforts reveal the complexities and challenges of dealing with unconstitutional changes in government, contested elections and violations of the region’s electoral code. Details: Johannesburg; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 191: Accessed November 2, 2012 at: Year: 2012 Country: South Africa URL: Shelf Number: 126854 Keywords: CybercrimesMaritime CrimesMaritime SecurityPiracy (South Africa)Socio-Economic Conditions |
Author: Shortland, Anja Title: The Business of Pirate Protection Summary: Somali piracy is often described as a form of organized crime. There is an implicit assumption that pirate gangs handle the entire process from hijack to ransom, including the provision of security for hijacked ships. This approach fails to distinguish between different actors within modern piracy and leads to policies focusing on deterring pirate recruits and lowering the returns to investors. Drawing on Protection Theory developed for the study of Mafias, a detailed analysis of Bloomberg maps of hijacked vessels’ routes, field interviews and Somali press reports, we show that there is a clear distinction between protectors of piracy and pirates. Clan elders and their militias facilitate piracy, because they protect hijacked ships in their anchorages and have well-established channels for coordinating actions where business interests cut across clan lines. This explains the relative stability and order within the piracy business, such as the lack of re-hijacking. The paper concludes by arguing that the solution to piracy needs to focus on the enablers rather than the executors of the crime, and should be at the substate, clan level. Details: Berlin: Economics of Security, 2012. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Economics of Security Working Paper 75: Accessed November 29, 2012 at: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.408691.de/diw_econsec0075.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.408691.de/diw_econsec0075.pdf Shelf Number: 127030 Keywords: HijackingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo Targeting System Summary: The U.S. economy is dependent on the expeditious flow of millions of tons of cargo each day. Cargo containers are an important instrument of global trade but also can present security concerns. CBP is responsible for administering container security programs, and its strategy for securing maritime cargo containers includes analyzing information to identify shipments that may contain terrorist weapons or other contraband. Because CBP has insufficient resources to examine every container, targeters use ATS to target which container shipments should be examined. GAO was asked to assess CBP's targeting efforts. This report addresses (1) how ATS supports CBP's targeting of maritime cargo container shipments for national security purposes and (2) the extent to which CBP assesses the effectiveness of ATS's national security targeting rules. GAO analyzed fiscal year 2011 CBP data on shipments and containers arriving at U.S. ports and containers scanned at these ports. GAO also visited six CBP units selected on the basis of the percentage of maritime shipments that were scored as high risk or medium risk for national security purposes at these locations in fiscal year 2011, among other factors. GAO also analyzed documents, such as CBP's ATS performance measures. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that CBP (1) ensure that future updates to the weight set are based on assessments of its performance and (2) establish targets for performance measures and use those measures to regularly assess effectiveness of the weight set. DHS concurred with these recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-9: Accessed November 29, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/649695.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/649695.pdf Shelf Number: 127035 Keywords: Cargo SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecuritySupply Chain Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Megaports Initiative Faces Funding and Sustainability Challenges Summary: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Megaports Initiative in 2003 to deter, detect, and interdict nuclear or other radiological materials smuggled through foreign seaports. The Initiative funds the installation of radiation detection equipment at select seaports overseas and trains foreign personnel to use this equipment to scan shipping containers entering and leaving these seaports - regardless of destination. NNSA provides partner countries with maintenance and technical support for about 3 years, after which it transfers the equipment and all related responsibilities to partner countries. GAO was asked to examine (1) the status of the Megaports Initiative and NNSA's plans for completing and sustaining it and (2) the benefits of the Initiative and factors that reduce its effectiveness. GAO analyzed key documents; interviewed agency officials; and visited eight Megaports in five countries, selected on the basis of port size and unique characteristics, among other things. GAO recommends that NNSA take actions, including (1) finalizing its long-term plan for ensuring the sustainability of Megaports operations after NNSA's final transfer of equipment to partner countries and (2) developing and maintaining useful and reliable measures to assess the performance of the Initiative. GAO also recommends that NNSA and DHS jointly assess the extent to which the two Initiatives are effectively coordinating. NNSA and DHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-37: Accessed December 7, 2012 at: Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 127143 Keywords: Maritime SecurityNuclear SmugglingNuclear WeaponsPort SecurityWeapons of Mass Destruction |
Author: Great Britain. House of Lords. European Union Committee Title: Turning the Tide on Piracy, Building Somalia's Future: Follow-Up Report on the EU's Operation Atalanta and Beyond Summary: Operation Atalanta is the EU’s first naval operation. It was launched in 2008 under UK leadership, with the purpose of protecting World Food Programme ships delivering aid to Somalia, and preventing and combating piracy off the Somali coast. The Committee first reported on Atalanta in April 2010, when we outlined a number of concerns about the mission and the situation in Somalia. Since then two further EU missions have been launched, one, based in Uganda, to train Somali security forces, (EUTM Somalia), and one to support regional maritime capacity-building in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean states (EUCAP Nestor). In this report we welcome the progress made in reducing the number of pirated ships as a result of efforts by the international naval task forces, including Atalanta, and by the shipping industry, which has increasingly used ship protection measures. In June 2012 eight pirated vessels and 215 hostages were held, compared with 23 vessels and 501 hostages in June the previous year. We consider that Operation Atalanta must be continued up to and beyond the expiry of its current mandate in December 2014 in order to avoid an upsurge in pirate activity. We welcome the increased involvement of Somalia’s neighbours, led by the Seychelles, in conducting piracy trials, though we have doubts about the transfer of sentenced pirates back to Somalia. We also have concerns about the problems created for the countries involved by the higher standards of prisons for pirates than for their other prisoners. We believe that some measure of rehabilitation should be established, especially for younger pirates, though we recognise that imprisonment needs to be a real deterrent. We note with satisfaction the extent of practical international cooperation in countering piracy, including by China, and the cooperation with regional organisations such as the African Union. We believe, however, that the Gulf States should make a greater effort to assist in solving the problems of piracy and Somalia. We concluded in our previous report that piracy would not be ended until the root causes of the problems in Somalia were successfully tackled. Since that report, the EU has developed its activity by formulating a Strategy for the Horn of Africa and appointing a Special Representative for the area, as well as launching EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor. We believe that the missions should be taken forward pro-actively and that the EU’s development aid should focus on providing alternative livelihoods for the Somali people. These missions must continue until the incentives for piracy are removed and the coastal states of the region are able to police their own coastlines. Taken together, we welcome these developments as assisting the necessary comprehensive solution to Somalia’s problems under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Details: London: The Stationery Office, 2012. 35p. Source: HL Paper 43: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2012 at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeucom/43/43.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeucom/43/43.pdf Shelf Number: 127242 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime Piracy (Somalia)Maritime SecurityPiracy (Somalia) |
Author: Hurlburt, Kaija Title: The Human Cost of Somali Piracy 2011 Summary: The latest version of the joint study by Oceans Beyond Piracy and the International Maritime Bureau was launched at the International Maritime Organization’s headquarters in London on June 22, 2012 and details the plight of seafarers at the hands of Somali pirates. The report is a combination of information provided by the signatory states to the Declaration Condemning Acts of Violence Against Seafarers, the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme (MPHRP), and data compiled by OBP. • 3,863 seafarers were fired upon by Somali pirates with assault rifles and rocket propelled grenades • 968 seafarers came into close contact with pirates, who managed to board their vessels • 413 seafarers were rescued from citadels • 1,206 hostages were held captive by Somali pirates • 555 seafarers were taken hostage in 2011; 645 hostages were captured in 2010 and remained captive during 2011; 6 tourists and aid workers were kidnapped on land • 35 hostages died as a result of pirate captivity in 2011 • Average length of captivity was 8 months. Details: London: International Maritime Bureau; Broomfield, CO: Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2012. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed February 26, 2013 at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/hcop_2011.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Somalia URL: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/hcop_2011.pdf Shelf Number: 127720 Keywords: Maritime CrimesMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks Summary: The world’s second and third largest economies are engaged in a standoff over the sovereignty of five islets and three rocks in the East China Sea, known as the Diaoyu in Chinese and the Senkaku in Japanese. Tensions erupted in September 2012 when Japan purchased three disputed islands from their private owner to keep them from the nationalist governor of Tokyo. In response, Beijing implemented a series of measures including the establishment of overlapping administration in the disputed waters. Both sides’ law enforcement agencies and militaries currently operate in close proximity in disputed naval and aerial space. Unlike foreign ministries, these actors have less institutional interest in containing crises and enjoy an information monopoly allowing them to shape domestic perceptions. The two countries lack the mutual trust and communication mechanisms to manage incidents, let alone to discuss intentions or operating protocols. In the event of a skirmish, heightened nationalism, especially in China, could constrict the room for diplomatic manoeuvres to de-escalate the situation. China’s actions reflect a “reactive assertive” tactic used previously in the South China Sea, whereby it exploits perceived provocations in disputed areas by other countries to take strong countermeasures to change the status quo in its favour. Interpreting the Japanese government’s decision to purchase the islands as a unilateral change to the status quo, China implemented a series of pre-planned actions with the goal of changing the facts on the ground. The most important was when Beijing declared territorial baselines around the islands in September, thus increasing the number and length of its law enforcement patrols to directly challenge Japan’s de facto control of the area. Many Chinese strategists perceive Japan to be a former empire continuing on a downward slide while China’s star is rising. For them, the time is right to respond resolutely and stake its ground with its eastern neighbour. Nationalism makes the sovereignty dispute in the East China Sea a highly explosive issue for China, more so than the South China Sea. Due to the brutal Japanese occupation of China in the 1930s, sentiments over the status of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands run deeper in the Chinese psyche than any other territorial dispute in modern Chinese history, with the exception of Taiwan. Beijing has for years exploited anti-Japan sentiment through patriotic education campaigns and has used nationalism to justify assertive actions. But while in the past it could more easily dial up or down nationalism through control of state-run media, the rapid rise of Internet use has eroded that control and begun to shape the context of policymaking. The government must now satisfy increasingly outspoken and critical citizens. Complementary economic ties – essential to both given China’s prioritised commitment to strong economic growth and Japan’s desire to rebuild its stagnated economy – have provided strong incentives to keep this dispute from escalating into armed conflict, a scenario neither side wants. But despite expressions by both governments that they wish to avoid a war, potential for escalation has increased and there is deepening pessimism on both sides over the prospects of a peaceful settlement. The strategic mistrust that characterises relations has been aggravated by their respective domestic situations. Without top leaders setting the tone for crisis mitigation, a tradition of back-channel diplomacy has disappeared. The relative weakness of China’s foreign ministry complicates bilateral relations and prevents effective crisis management, as it is the official – and often the only – channel open to Tokyo. Meanwhile, the “China hands” in Japan who traditionally helped manage the relationship have been sidelined. While there is little hope of a resolution of the sovereignty dispute in the near future, Tokyo and Beijing urgently need to work toward establishing communication mechanisms and strengthening crisis mitigation in order to avoid a larger conflict. Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2013. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 245: Accessed April 9, 2013 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/245-dangerous-waters-china-japan-relations-on-the-rocks Year: 2013 Country: Asia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/245-dangerous-waters-china-japan-relations-on-the-rocks Shelf Number: 128319 Keywords: Maritime Crime (China, Japan)Maritime Security |
Author: Feldt, Lutz Title: Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach Summary: Challenges to “Maritime Security” have many faces – piracy and armed robbery, maritime terrorism, illicit trafficking by sea, i.e. narcotics trafficking, small arms and light weapons trafficking, human trafficking, global climate change, cargo theft etc. These challenges keep evolving and may be hybrid in nature: an interconnected and unpredictable mix of traditional and irregular warfare, terrorism, and/or organized crime. In our study we focus on piracy, armed robbery and maritime terrorism. Starting with principle observations regarding Maritime Security and the threat situation, we have a look at operational requirements and maritime collaboration featuring Maritime Domain Awareness. Finally, we give recommendations for political, military and business decision makers. Details: Berlin: Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung ISPSW, 2013. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue No. 222: Accessed May 9, 2013 at: www.ispsw.de Year: 2013 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 128690 Keywords: Armed RobberyMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityMaritime TerrorismPiracy/Pirates |
Author: Thiele, Ralph D. Title: Building Maritime Security Situational Awareness Summary: Maritime domain security relies on the ability to build a comprehensive awareness of maritime activity. Although it is still in the developmental stages situational awareness is the prerequisite of maritime domain security. Today technological developments such as space‐based systems, over‐the‐horizon radar, and nearshore and harbour acoustics can be incorporated into a layered approach to increase security. To identify and address weaknesses in the system, industry and academia have been discussing ways in which technology, based on advanced modelling and simulation tools can be used to identify threats and determine potential impacts. Numerous governmental, military and business organizations already possess valuable inputs into shared situational awareness. However, no one source captures all of the maritime information needed or currently available. The information exchange between government agencies and with private industry, in particular, sharing common databases, is the real power behind maritime domain awareness centres. Details: Berlin: Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung ISPSW, 2013. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue No. 182: Accessed May 13, 2013 at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=140759 Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=140759 Shelf Number: 128696 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Hodgson, J.R.F. Title: Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project The Role of the International Maritime Organization In Combating Piracy Summary: The objective of this paper is to explore the role of IMO as the leading multilateral agency tasked with addressing the issue of piracy, and to assess the effectiveness of that role in the light of the serious issues and challenges presented by the current scale of piracy off the East Coast of Africa, and elsewhere in the world. More particularly its goal is to examine the degree to which the mandate and authority assigned to the Organization for dealing with security issues such as piracy is adequate and appropriate. Also for consideration is whether the treaty and governance parameters within which it is constrained to operate enable the Organization to meet its responsibilities. A particular focus is the effectiveness of the decision-making challenges associated with IMO’s policy development process, involving as it does a multilateral body that must not only work with national administrations, interest groups and industry, but must also interface with numerous other multilateral bodies. This paper is proposed as a first step in a two (or more) step process. The intent is that it provides a basis for discussion with those members of the staff of IMO who are engaged in policy development, and program design and implementation, and with leading maritime industry associations and NGOs, with a view to confirming, modifying and/or amplifying observations made in the paper. It is therefore structured to generate ‘Discussion Points’, which can then form the basis for such discussions. These Discussion Points are therefore included in the text of the paper and assembled at the end. It should be stressed that the focus of this short paper is upon the effectiveness of IMO and its governance processes in addressing the issue of piracy. To undertake this assessment it is necessary to provide brief outlines of the nature and extent of the piracy related work in which IMO is engaged. It is, however, beyond the scope of the paper to provide a comprehensive description and analysis of this work, and the reader must look elsewhere for such material. Details: Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University, 2012. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Marine Affairs Program Technical Report #7: Accessed May 21, 2013 at: http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/Dalhousie-Marine-Affairs-Program-Technical-Report-%237-2012-12.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/Dalhousie-Marine-Affairs-Program-Technical-Report-%237-2012-12.pdf Shelf Number: 128762 Keywords: Maritime CrimesMaritime SecurityPiracy/Pirates |
Author: Whitman, S. Title: Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project: Exploring an Integrated Approach to the Suppression and Prevention of Marine Piracy Summary: Piracy, one of the oldest crimes in history, has had its peaks and lows of activity throughout various regions around the world. Even though each outbreak has its own set of actors, motives, tactics and targets, anti-piracy responses have understandably focused on addressing the problem as it arises on the sea. This focus on where the problem manifests itself as opposed to the source of the problem has failed to sufficiently address the root causes of piracy. On the premise that the source of piracy is deeply embedded in the social, political and economic structures of society, the Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project (DMPP) goal was to undertake an integrated and interdisciplinary approach to assessing and addressing the problem of contemporary piracy and its impact on the shipping and coastal communities. To achieve this goal, the DMPP aimed to understand potential piracy situations before they manifest, and sought to identify appropriate social, economic, security and political indicators and actions needed to prevent outbreaks of piracy. To that end, it also sought to provide a comprehensive suite of integrated policy alternatives to be considered by key policy actors in the suppression and prevention of piracy In pursuit of the above goal, the project, entitled ‘Policy Development and Interdisciplinary Research for Actions on Coastal Communities, Youth and Seafarers’, embarked on: A comprehensive examination of contemporary piracy to determine the true socio-economic costs and effects that piracy has on seafarers, coastal states and those communities; An integrated assessment of cross-cutting policy alternatives for dealing with the problem in a comprehensive manner; A review of the consequences associated with implementing the identified policy options; An identification of the strategic directions that need to be adopted to implement corrective measures; and, The development of a preliminary generalized model for predicting the emergence of piracy. The DMPP team recognized the significant contributions being made by scholars and practitioners who have focused on addressing the problem of piracy from either a thematic focus (e.g. operational, economic or social) and/or a geographic focus (e.g. the Horn of Africa). In contrast to this approach, the DMPP focused on drawing on these existing analyses to identify cross-cutting linkages and gaps in the knowledge base that require policy makers’ attention at the international, regional, national and local levels, in an effort to address potential actions to contribute to the discouragement and suppression of piracy The objective was not to conduct original research, but to deliver policy innovative outputs from the analysis in the form of an interdisciplinary suite of policy options that reflected a paradigmatic shift in the way piracy is understood, suppressed and prevented. The intention is to make the recommended policy options available for public comment, and to present them to governments, the private sector, agencies of the United Nations and civil society, including Non- Government Organizations (NGOs). A key objective of the DMPP is to pursue opportunities for getting the project findings onto the agenda of high-level meetings of policy makers and practitioners to develop specific policy responses aimed at addressing the problem of global marine piracy in an integrated manner. This interdisciplinary report seeks to draw on the analysis of the socio-economic, governance aspects and operational response factors inherent in contemporary marine piracy in order to capture the key findings of each thematic area of study and, thereafter, to expand on those findings that have synergies across the reports. The report reflects the ‘integrated or interdisciplinary thinking’ of the DMPP Team - the application of the collective mind - in collating all the relevant data about the socio-economic and human costs of piracy, the counter-piracy policies and practices, and varied legal regimes, organizational strategies and governance processes. The report goes on to provide a clear reference point for other follow-up research projects and presentations. Details: Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Marine Affairs Program Technical Report #4: Accessed May 21, 2013 at: http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/Dalhousie-Marine-Affairs-Program-Technical-Report-%234-2012-12.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/Dalhousie-Marine-Affairs-Program-Technical-Report-%234-2012-12.pdf Shelf Number: 128763 Keywords: Maritime CrimesMaritime SecurityPiracy/Pirates |
Author: Fanning, L. Title: Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project: Legal, Institutional and Governance Arrangements for Apprehending and Prosecuting Marine Pirates Summary: Under the broader mandate of the DMPP, the Law and Governance Module is investigating three (3) major themes that focus on the origins and manifestations of piracy; the apprehension of piracy; and the prosecution of piracy. This Report is a key output from the first phase of the project which primarily utilized desk top research conducted between June 2011 and February 2012. Its main purpose is to serve as a discussion piece for the DMPP external Law and Governance Module working group members. It is anticipated that working group members will critically review the context and analysis of the report for accuracy and omissions, identify priority areas for attention, identify areas for further research and recommend draft policy options anticipated to address issues surrounding the law and governance aspects of contemporary marine piracy. For ease of reference and additional insight, the Report offers some key discussion points within its sections and conclusion. Whilst by no means exhaustive, the research analysis reflected herein is geared towards answering four major research questions pertaining to: 1) The current legal and institutional arrangements for addressing piracy; 2) The current legal regime dealing with the apprehension, prosecution and incarceration of pirates; 3) The legal status of pirates, child pirates, suspect pirates, organizers and their backers; and, 4) The governance conditions that allow piracy to gain a foothold. The discussions provide an interpretive outline of the three major formulations or definitions of piracy found within international law, a summary of the national approaches taken by States to incorporate those definitions in their national laws dealing with the suppression of crime at sea; and examine how the DMPP-formulated definition complies with current legal practices. While a plethora of arrangements exist that both directly and indirectly have a role in addressing piracy, the Report also highlights the key arrangements for coordinating and organizing the fight against piracy at the international, regional and other institutional/organizational levels. Given the role of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as the leading multilateral agency tasked with addressing the issue of piracy, the DMPP Law and Governance team undertook a preliminary analysis to assess the effectiveness of that role in light of the serious issues and challenges presented by the current scale of piracy off the East Coast of Africa, and elsewhere in the world. Drawing upon several insightful interpretations of the rights, duties and obligations of states in the investigation, apprehension and prosecution of suspect pirates, the resulting analysis concluded that the legal regime and mechanisms employed to date have not been without its challenges and difficulties. In addition to national courts, several other avenues have been recommended and analyzed, whether they are applicable for prosecuting those found committing or attempting to commit acts of piracy, including those involved in piracy operations, more particularly piracy backers, organizers and financiers. Emphasis has also been placed on those who use Hawala and other value transfer systems to facilitate the movement of funds to aid piracy operations, those who seek to employ children as pirates and those who may be proven guilty of participating in transnational organized crime, or in extreme cases, crimes against humanity. Special consideration was also given to the status and rights of the child, prosecution of young offenders and the problems with returning a child to the worst forms of labor. In deliberating on the dominant conditions that have seemingly allowed piracy to gain a foothold particularly within the East African region (Horn of Africa), some structural indicators evident within functional/strong states were examined as the basis for analyzing the influence of failed states and to some extent, weak states, on maritime piracy operations. Additionally, analysis of the current literature undertaken for this project suggests that the effectiveness of existing governance regimes at the national, regional and international levels are inextricably linked to the root causes of piracy. Similarly, the linkages between and among relevant institutional arrangements in terms of their functionalities and the process for ensuring data and information, analysis and advice are provided to guide decision-making at national, regional and international levels need to be determined and where necessary, strengthened. From a governance effectiveness perspective, it is evident that there is a broad array of policy actors who are engaged in addressing the problem of marine piracy. As such, the DMPP research has highlighted that considerable emphasis should be placed by scholars, practitioners and decision-makers on the need to understand and address marine piracy at multiple jurisdictional levels. Before concluding, the Report discusses the initial efforts of the DMPP to develop a generalized predictive model that would provide the global maritime community with a preliminary decision-support tool aimed at anticipating potential piracy ‘hot spots’. The development of this predictive model draws upon the research conducted by all three of the DMPP modules and identifies the socioeconomic, governance, legal and other relevant precursors to the outbreak of contemporary piracy. The policy implications of such a tool are widespread as it can provide the incentives needed for targeted pre-emptive responses to be structured and focused before the problem becomes manifest. Most significantly, it has the potential to modify and enhance governance regimes in areas flagged as potentially susceptible to piracy and more than likely (to experience piracy activity in the near future), with the potential for other global, regional and national security-related risks. Details: Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University, 2012. 139p. Source: Internet Resource: Marine Affairs Program Technical Report #2: Accessed May 21, 2013 at: http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/MAP_Technical_Report_%232.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/MAP_Technical_Report_%232.pdf Shelf Number: 128769 Keywords: Maritime CrimesMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesProsecution |
Author: Permal, Sumathy Title: Safe Waters: Malaysia’s Response to Enhancing Security in Southeast Asia’s Maritime Domain Summary: Europe and Asia share a long history of multilateral and bilateral relations. Both regions have many things in common including political, economic and cultural ties which have always been closely interlinked. Despite these long-standing relations, new challenges are currently emerging. Maritime security issues such as piracy, cross-border illegal activities and threats emanating from non state actors are bound to pose challenges to the maritime security environment. Malaysia has bilateral and tri-lateral cooperation mechanisms in place to address these challenges, although stronger initiatives along these lines with the EU are yet to materialise. The same can be said of cooperation between the EU and Asia on this issue, and advancing efforts on maritime security in the region and beyond where Malaysia’s interests are at stake require the development of a comprehensive security framework for Europe and Asia. Maritime piracy is a highly sophisticated crime involving all the activities of legitimate company operations although its profits also underwrite other illegal activities such as human trafficking. As with challenges facing other areas of maritime security, there has been scant cooperation between the EU and Asia on addressing this scourge. This study aims to propose links through comprehensive country studies that would bring the EU and Asia closer together in this area by addressing maritime security challenges in the Southeast Asia region with specific attention to issues affecting Malaysia. Details: Kuala Lumpur Malaysia: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2012. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper: Accessed June 4, 2013 at: http://www.eu-asia.eu/index.php?eID=tx_nawsecuredl&u=0&file=fileadmin/KAS_Files/documents/Paper_Permal.pdf&t=1370440410&hash=de2d3586ef8d80f7905acda873625de38236203b Year: 2012 Country: Malaysia URL: http://www.eu-asia.eu/index.php?eID=tx_nawsecuredl&u=0&file=fileadmin/KAS_Files/documents/Paper_Permal.pdf&t=1370440410&hash=de2d3586ef8d80f7905acda873625de38236203b Shelf Number: 128933 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHuman TraffickingMaritime Crime (Malaysia)Maritime SecurityPirates/PiracyRobberySmuggling |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Transportation Security: Action Needed to Strengthen TSA's Security Threat Assessment Process Summary: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) implements programs that, for example, ensure individuals with unescorted access to secure areas of the nation’s critical transportation infrastructure do not pose a security threat. Key to these programs are security threat assessments that screen individuals for links to terrorism, criminal history, and immigration status. TSA’s Adjudication Center serves as the primary operational component in this process. GAO was asked to examine the performance and staffing strategy of the center. This report addresses the extent to which 1) TSA has measured performance for the center and what the data show; 2) TSA offices have coordinated to meet security threat assessment workload; and 3) TSA addressed potential risks posed by using a mix of government employees and contractors to adjudicate security threat assessments. GAO analyzed TSA data describing the center’s performance since October 2010; reviewed documentation, including staffing plans; and interviewed TSA officials about data measurement and staffing practices. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that TSA, among other things: direct the Adjudication Center to calculate an accuracy rate that includes adjudicator performance for cases where applicants were both approved and disqualified; share adjudicator staffing plans among key program offices; and update its Adjudication Center workforce conversion plan and provide it to DHS for review and approval. DHS concurred with our recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-629: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/656051.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/656051.pdf Shelf Number: 129590 Keywords: Airport SecurityCargo SecurityMaritime SecurityThreat AssessmentsTransportation Security (U.S.) |
Author: Madsen, Jens Vestergaard Title: The State of Maritime Piracy 2013 Summary: This report is the latest in a series by Oceans Beyond Piracy tracking the economic and human costs of maritime piracy. For the past three years, OBP has attempted to model the overall impact of Somali piracy on the global economy and on people affected by piracy. In this report, we look at the impact of piracy in 2013. Trends in maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea in 2013 represent a continuation and in some cases an acceleration of issues marked by observers in 2012. The decline in piracy off the coast of Somalia continued, as did attacks, kidnapping, and violence associated with piracy off the West Coast of Africa. Alongside these shifts, the use of armed security aboard ships in the Indian Ocean continued. In recognition of these trends, this report represents an expansion of the scope of the research offered by Oceans Beyond Piracy. Acknowledging the changing face of maritime piracy, this year's report extends the geographic focus of our research to include West African piracy, and compiles both the economic and human costs into one omnibus report. As with previous years, the numbers presented here represent a good-faith effort by Oceans Beyond Piracy and our partners to provide an estimate of the scope and impact of maritime piracy on the maritime community and the other stakeholders impacted by these crimes. Practically, this estimate is limited because of serious challenges relating to the availability of good data on the scope of the problem. This is particularly true in considering piracy and armed robbery at sea off the West Coast of Africa, where the multinational reporting systems supported as a part of the joint effort to address Somali piracy are largely absent. As a result, the information presented here should be considered a studied estimate of the impacts of piracy rather than a definitive and precise report. We welcome comments and constructive suggestions on how to improve our methods used, and as with previous years we have incorporated responses to prior reports into the methods used in this report. Structure of the Report This year's report is broken into four sections. First, we present an overview of what our research has identified as the number of attacks and other key aspects of piracy in 2013. Second, we review the economic and human costs of piracy off the horn of Africa. Third, we do the same for the West Coast of Africa. Finally, we address some of the long-term impacts of piracy. Details: Broomfield, CO: Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2014. 115p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 17, 2014 at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/SoP2013-Digital_0.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/SoP2013-Digital_0.pdf Shelf Number: 132481 Keywords: Armed Robbery Against ShipsEconomics of CrimeMaritime CrimeMaritime PiracyMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Scott, Kenneth Title: Prosecuting Pirates: Lessons Learned and Continuing Challenges Summary: Since 2005, there has been growing consensus and frequently recurring calls in the international community for the leaders, financiers, and land-based facilitators of modern maritime piracy to be prosecuted. There is broad recognition (at least in concept and rhetoric) that successfully prosecuting the low-level skiff pirates, while part of the equation, will ultimately have limited impact on ending or substantially reducing piracy, at least in terms of the law enforcement and prosecution components of national and international counter-piracy efforts. Indeed, one of the four priorities of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia for 2013 and beyond is "[t]o strengthen and focus law enforcement efforts to disrupt pirate networks ashore, including by establishing effective information exchanges among prosecutors, investigators and private industry" Yet to date, with the exception of the conviction of two pirate negotiators (which might be considered mid-level management) and the recent arrest of pirate leader Mohamed Abdi Hassan (better known as "Afweyne") in Belgium, there have been no prosecutions of higher- or top-level pirate leaders, financiers, or facilitators. While approximately 1,200 pirates have been, or are being prosecuted in various parts of the world (primarily in Somalia, 402; Kenya, 164; Yemen, 129; and Seychelles, 124),2 almost none of them can be considered anything more than low-level skiff pirates. Why is that the case, and what lessons can the international community and national authorities learn from our experience fighting East African piracy, in fighting piracy elsewhere, or indeed dealing with other international and transnational crime? Details: Broomfield, CO: Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2014. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2014 at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/ProsecutingPiratesReportDigital_2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/ProsecutingPiratesReportDigital_2.pdf Shelf Number: 132579 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Coast Guard: Resource Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands Summary: The Coast Guard provided varying levels of resources for drug interdiction operations in the transit zonethe area from South America through the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean that is used to transport illicit drugs to the United Statesduring fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and generally did not meet its performance targets for several reasons. As the figure shows, Coast Guard resources included vessels (cutters), aircraft, and law enforcement detachments. The number of cutter days, aircraft hours, and law enforcement detachment days the Coast Guard provided for drug interdiction operations in the transit zone varied during fiscal years 2009 through 2012, and then sharply declined in fiscal year 2013. For example, in fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard provided 1,947 cutter days for transit zone operations and in fiscal year 2013 the Coast Guard provided 1,346 daysa 30 percent decline. During fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the Coast Guard met targets for its primary drug interdiction mission performance measurethe removal rate of cocaine from noncommercial vessels in the transit zoneonce, in fiscal year 2013. Coast Guard officials cited the declining readiness of its aging vessels, delays in the delivery of replacement vessels, and sequestration as factors affecting Coast Guard resource deployments and the ability to meet its drug interdiction mission performance targets. In support of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) effort to address the increased violent crime associated with illicit drug smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Coast Guard has increased vessel and aircraft operations for drug interdiction efforts in these territories by reallocating resources from elsewhere in the Coast Guard. According to Coast Guard officials, these additional resources are drawn from other missions, such as alien migrant interdiction. Beginning in September 2012, the Coast Guard implemented a surge operation to provide additional vessels and aircraft to regularly patrol Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to Coast Guard officials, the increased vessel and aircraft deployments have since become the new baseline level of resources to be provided for drug interdiction operations there. According to Coast Guard data, the number of vessel hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in these territories more than tripled from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Similarly, the number of maritime patrol aircraft hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in the territories increasedfrom about 150 flight hours in fiscal year 2011 to about 1,000 hours in fiscal year 2013. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2014. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-14-527: Accessed July 7, 2014 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664098.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664098.pdf Shelf Number: 132631 Keywords: Border SecurityCoast GuardDrug EnforcementDrug TraffickingHomeland SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Ongoing U.S. Counterpiracy Efforts Would Benefit From Agency Assessments Summary: Piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa's east coast near Somalia have declined sharply since 2010, but U.S. agencies have not assessed their counterpiracy efforts as GAO recommended in 2010. Since 2010, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports piracy incidents declined from 219 to 15 in 2013. Similarly, from 2010 to 2013 hostages taken by pirates declined from 1,016 to 34. Also, a World Bank report stated that total ransoms declined by 2012. Officials participating in counterpiracy activities from the Departments of Defense and State, among others, as well as shipping industry officials and international partners, attribute the decline to a combination of prevention, disruption, and prosecution activities. However, officials cautioned that this progress is tenuous, and discontinuing these efforts could allow piracy to resurge. Despite changing conditions, U.S. agencies have not systematically assessed the costs and benefits of their counterpiracy efforts. Agency officials stated that their decisions and actions are guided by discussions rather than formal assessments. GAO has previously noted that assessments of risk and effectiveness in an interagency environment can strengthen strategies and resource usage. As such, GAO's prior recommendations remain valid and could help U.S. agencies identify the most cost effective mix of efforts and prioritize activities as they respond to changing conditions and fiscal pressures while avoiding a resurgence in piracy. Off the west coast of Africa, piracy and maritime crime has been a persistent problem in the Gulf of Guinea, as shown in the figure below. Although the United States has interagency and international efforts underway with African states to strengthen maritime security, it has not assessed its efforts or the need for a collective plan to address the evolving problem in the region. The U.S. role in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has focused on prevention, disruption, and prosecution, through training and assistance to African coastal states. However, according to U.S. agencies working in the region, the National Security Council Staff (NSCS) has not directed them to collectively assess their efforts to address piracy and maritime crime. An assessment of agencies' Gulf of Guinea efforts could strengthen their approach by informing the appropriate mix of activities to achieve the most effective use of limited resources, as well as help determine if additional actions are needed. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2014. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-14-422: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=755244 Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=755244 Shelf Number: 132795 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Anyimadu, Adjoa Title: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons Learned from the Indian Ocean Summary: As rates of piracy emanating from Somalia's coast fall, international attention is shifting towards insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea - the waters off Africa's west coast. Maritime crimes including oil-bunkering, drug-trafficking and illegal fishing are of economic and security concern to the wider international community as well as to local states. There are a number of critical differences between maritime insecurity off Africa's east and west coasts, but the Gulf of Guinea's littoral states and stakeholders further afield can draw valuable lessons from the experience of combating Somali piracy to help shape their responses to West Africa's maritime threats. Early action by policy-makers - regionally and further afield - could do much to ensure that criminality does not evolve and increase to an unmanageable extent. Those who commit illegal acts at sea are highly adaptable, increasingly sophisticated in their methods and often well informed, and so local, regional and global efforts must be flexible and proactive. Timing is especially important, as a number of West African states will go to the polls in 2015, presenting an unprecedented challenge to the region's security and stability and risking maritime security slipping down the agenda. Details: London: Chatham House, 2013. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa 2013/02: Accessed August 23, 2014 at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0713pp_maritimesecurity_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Guinea URL: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0713pp_maritimesecurity_0.pdf Shelf Number: 129892 Keywords: Drug TraffickingIllegal FishingMaritime Crime (Guinea)Maritime SecurityPiracy |
Author: Schbley, Ghassan Title: Piracy, Illegal Fishing, and Maritime Insecurity in Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania Summary: Long coastlines, porous borders, a lack of government capacity, weak enforcement mechanisms, corruption, and other factors have enabled illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing to thrive in Somalia's waters. The same factors have allowed other transnational threats to develop in Somalia-and spread further south into Kenya and Tanzania. This study, which draws on extensive field research along the East African littoral, identifies and analyzes linkages between piracy and IUU fishing. In addition, the report examines the role of the maritime sector in facilitating the illegal movement of drugs, weapons, and people through the region. This study also highlights the role of small vessels in a system that transports terrorists from al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda's East Africa affiliate, to and from Somalia. Details: Arlington, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2013. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IIM-2013-U-005731-Final3.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IIM-2013-U-005731-Final3.pdf Shelf Number: 133298 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal FishingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Africa)Wildlife Crimes |
Author: Engel, Ulf Title: The African Union, the African peace and security architecture, and maritime security Summary: The content of African maritime security as an emerging policy field is contested. It can be located anywhere between traditional security politics (i.e. related to piracy, maritime terrorism and unregulated fishing), developmental and environmentalist concerns as well as efforts to regain economic sovereignty over African territorial and offshore waters. As a result, since approximately 2005, the institutional place of maritime security in continental politics has been in flux. This paper traces the origins of the debate on maritime security in Africa. The main concern here is to examine the relationship between the nascent African Peace and Security Architecture on the one hand and maritime security and safety politics on the other from both an institutional and a political perspective. Maritime security represents one of a number of peace and security-related policy fields in-the-making that also allows for insights into the division of labor emerging among various stakeholders, such as the AUC, RECs, and AU member states - and the related challenges of policy coordination and harmonization. Details: Addis Ababa : Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014. Addis Ababa : Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: FES peace and security series ; 13: Accessed September 18, 2014 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/aethiopien/10878.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/aethiopien/10878.pdf Shelf Number: 133377 Keywords: Maritime Crime (Africa)Maritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: United Nations Institute for Training and Research Title: UNOSAT Global Report on maritime piracy: A geospatial analysis 1995-2013 Summary: This global report on maritime piracy has identified several important trends related to maritime security. Based on a refined and detailed analysis of primarily data from International Maritime Organization (IMO) Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) "Piracy and Armed Robbery" module UNITAR has been able to explore how trends in geospatial patterns and severity of reported piracy incidents are developing, from 1995 to 2013. Some detailed geospatial analyses focus on the period 2006-2013 due to improved records for geo-locating incidents. Our analysis includes the added cost of piracy for the maritime industry at a global level and how these are linked to anti-piracy initiatives. Furthermore, costs related to paid ransoms and effects on the local economy in piracy land-bases are explored. There are two areas where significant trends in piracy activities are observed: the Western Indian Ocean, including the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf of Guinea. In other areas, notably eastern Indian Ocean, including the Malacca Strait, and in South America, no major trends are observed. While activities in South America are relatively minor, piracy in the Malacca Strait continues to be a major disruptior for safe routes in the eastern Indian Ocean. Details: Geneva: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 2014. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 1, 2015 at: http://unosat.web.cern.ch/unosat/unitar/publications/UNITAR_UNOSAT_Piracy_1995-2013.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://unosat.web.cern.ch/unosat/unitar/publications/UNITAR_UNOSAT_Piracy_1995-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 135104 Keywords: Geospatial AnalysisMaritime CrimeMaritime PiracyMaritime SecurityPirates/PiracyRansoms |
Author: Janecek, Michael J. Title: Policing Iranian Sanctions: Trade, Identity, and Smuggling Networks in the Arabian Gulf Summary: There are continual debates regarding the effectiveness of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1803 and 1929 as tools for limiting the Islamic Republic of Iran's goals for a nuclear program. This thesis examines the enforceability of the maritime sections of both resolutions at the police level in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Arab nations along the Arabian Gulf have had long-standing maritime trade relations with Iran and the greater Indian Ocean that extend generations into history. This relationship led to the extensive merging of Arab and Persian cultures in the GCC, as well as the growth of an immigrant workforce from South Asia. With this influx of identities and nationalities, challenges were developed in enforcing both resolutions, specifically as it relates to the inspection of Iranian maritime cargo. Alongside this merging of cultures, is the growth of successful maritime drug-smuggling networks that weapons proliferators could exploit to intentionally violate UNSCR 1803 and 1929. Based on the challenges of maritime trade, cultural and national identity, as well as criminal activity, it is argued that both resolutions are an unnatural fit in the Arabian Gulf, and are therefore questionable as policy choices in the GCC countries. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 2013. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32840/13Mar_Janecek_Michael.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: Iran URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32840/13Mar_Janecek_Michael.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 136483 Keywords: Drug TraffickingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecuritySmuggling |
Author: Walker, Timothy Title: Enhancing maritime domain awareness in Africa Summary: While numerous crimes and threats occur in the African maritime domain, there is also great potential for prosperity. African states are positioning themselves to benefit from the oceans and seas by implementing strategies on continental, regional and national levels. These states should support a culture of information-sharing, since this represents one of the most important ways of facilitating and strengthening maritime cooperation and improving security. In particular, stakeholders must support the establishment of centres to collate, analyse and disseminate information and data in a holistic, transparent and trustworthy manner. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2015. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 79: Accessed March 2, 2016 at: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PolBrief79.pdf Year: 2015 Country: South Africa URL: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PolBrief79.pdf Shelf Number: 138030 Keywords: Maritime Crime Maritime SecurityPiracy |
Author: Great Britain. Ministry of Defence Title: The UK national strategy for maritime security Summary: 1.1 The UK considers 'maritime security' to be the advancement and protection of the UK's national interests, at home and abroad, through the active management of risks and opportunities in and from the maritime domain, in order to strengthen and extend the UK's prosperity, security and resilience and to help shape a stable world. 1.2 This strategy places the maritime domain in context and explains why it matters to the UK. It sets out our approach and the objectives we wish to achieve, as well as explaining how we intend to improve our efforts in future. Finally, it outlines the governance structure which will allow us to deliver effective and efficient maritime security. Details: London: HM Government, 2014. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310323/National_Strategy_for_Maritime_Security_2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310323/National_Strategy_for_Maritime_Security_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 138484 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Metropolican Police Authority Title: Under Lock and Quay: Reducing Criminal Opportunity by Design Summary: Under Lock and Quay Foreword Londons Waterways are an accessible cult ural and environmental asset which also act as a catalyst for regeneration and inward investment. They are playing an increasingly important role in the capital's tourism industry as well as becoming popular for residential, commercial and leisure development, all of which impact substantially on the patterns of movement along the waterways and the growing number of different users. There is a growing national awareness of the added value and commercial betterment of development alongside water, and recent major schemes have demonstrated the success and potential for future development. There is a real opportunity to capitalise on this resource and British Waterways are striving to improve access to, and enhance the vitality of, the waterway network. It is important therefore that issues relating to crime and the fear of crime are tackled using positive and long-term solutions which are in keeping with the built and natural heritage of this historic transport network to encourage greater and safer use of waterside facilities. Inland waterways are an integral part of London's natural and industrial heritage as well as having a vital social role to play through the provision of publicly accessible areas for informal recreation and educational purposes. However, British Waterways and the Metropolitan Police recognise that the linear nature of the waterways, particularly canals which have a limited number of crossing points, often result in segregation of waterside areas from their surroundings and increased opportunity for criminal activities to occur. It is often the fear of crime rather than actual danger itself which discourages peop le from venturing along the towing path. Safety and security issues are inextricably bound up with enhancement, conservation and development, yet addressing the problem is often done on an ad-hoc basis once development is complete. This leads to ineffective and inappropriate treatment which can have two negative impacts upon the waterway environment: - creates an environment which can be inad vertently perceived as being unsafe; or - changes the historic charac ter of the waterway irrevocably as to make it less desirable to visit. Therefore, British Waterways and the Metropolitan Police are of the view that design measures to improve security should ideally be included at the planning stage as part of an integral approach to new development, regeneration, and environmental improvement schemes in order to design out crime. Details: London: Canal River Trust, 2000. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2016 at: https://canalrivertrust.org.uk/media/library/309.pdf Year: 2000 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://canalrivertrust.org.uk/media/library/309.pdf Shelf Number: 139626 Keywords: Built EnvironmentCrime PreventionDesign Against CrimeMaritime CrimeMaritime Security |
Author: Tallis, Joshua Title: Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory Summary: This dissertation explores the growing field of study around Maritime Security. While an increasingly common sub-heading in American naval strategy documents, maritime security operations are largely framed around individual threats (i.e. counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics). Here, we endeavor to explore how a seemingly disparate set of transnational issues fit into a more coherent framework to give greater theoretical substance to the notion of Maritime Security as a distinct concept. In particular, we examine, as our research question, whether the Broken Windows theory, a criminological construct of social disorganization, provides the lens through which to theorize maritime security in the littorals. By extrapolating from criminology, this dissertation engages with a small but growing impulse in studies on insurgencies, terrorism, and piracy to look beyond classic theories of security to better understand phenomena of political violence. To evaluate our research question, we begin by identifying two critical components of the Broken Windows theory, multidimensionality and context specificity. Multidimensionality refers to the web of interrelated individuals, organizations, and infrastructure upon which crime operates. Context specificity refers to the powerful influence of an individual or community's environment on behavior. These two themes, as explored in this dissertation, are brought into stark relief through an application of the Broken Windows theory. Leveraging this understanding of the theory, we explore our research question by employing process-tracing and detailed descriptions across three case studies (one primary and two illustrative) - the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In so doing, we demonstrate how applying the lens that Broken Windows provides yields new and interesting perspectives on maritime security. As a consequence, this dissertation offers an example of a theoretical framework that provides greater continuity to the missions or threats frequently binned under the heading of maritime security, but infrequently associated with one another in the literature. Details: Fife, Scotland: University of St.Andrews, 2016. 311p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 20, 2016 at: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/9028 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/9028 Shelf Number: 139719 Keywords: Broken Windows TheoryMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracySmugglingTerrorism |
Author: Kuperman, Mark I. Title: Re-Thinking Maritime Risk: Linking Piracy, Global Shipping and Ports - and - what Cruise/Ferry Terminals Can Learn from Airports Summary: This thesis addresses two issues related to maritime risk. The first concerns recognizing high-volume shipping destined for U.S. ports initially journeys through foreign waters and ports where crime, piracy and terrorism are hazards. The second issue is prioritizing maritime risk mitigation in response to multi-variable threats and vulnerabilities. This subject is compounded by limited resources and a reliance on collaborative partnerships. The thesis mainly focuses on the relationship between piracy and U.S. maritime interests since piracy has a nexus offshore and in waterways where U.S.-bound ships originate or transit. The approach is three-fold. First, the initial two chapters identify piracy as a threat which shipping encounters in global hot-spots before entering U.S. waters. Chapter 1 associates connections between piracy and terrorism, mariners' safety in regions/waterways, and challenges of eradicating piracy, with a focused study on the Straits of Malacca. Chapter 2 identifies when offshore piracy may threaten the U.S., emphasizing the Gulf of Guinea. Chapter 3 transitions back to U.S. solutions in protecting ferry and cruise passengers within confined terminal spaces. The thesis results indicate risk-related findings. Chapter 1 highlights collaborative challenges foreign nations need to overcome while trying to protect citizens and eradicate crime/piracy. Also in Chapter 1, the findings reveal piracy and terrorism in the Straits of Malacca do not appear related. Chapter 2 categorizes the types of offshore piracy that pose risk to the U.S. Chapter 3 undertakes a multi-variable analysis of inter-modal risk mitigations and suggests certain airport models may work in ferry and cruise terminals. Details: Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2014. 125p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed July 29, 2016 at: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/37227 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/37227 Shelf Number: 139889 Keywords: Airport Security Maritime Crime Maritime Security Piracy Risk MitigationVessel Security |
Author: Potgieter, Thean Title: Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: strategic setting and features Summary: For millennia the peoples living around the Indian Ocean have benefited from its rich trade, while the interaction resulting from these maritime exploits, whether of a cultural and religious nature, or of conquest and slavery, invariable influenced their lives fundamentally. These traditional patterns of trade and communication changed drastically when first the Portuguese and then other European powers began sailing around the Cape of Good Hope to establish trade links and empires in the East. Initially Africa was little affected by European maritime activity as the focus was on trade with the East. Africa's primary value was to provide refuge and provisions along a long and often hazardous route. The formidable warships of the European naval powers were rapidly able to establish dominance in the Indian Ocean and projected their influence to the furthest corners of region. Naval forces were crucial for the establishment of national interests and for countering the activities of other European nations. Over the centuries, the British in particular, because of their effective utilisation of sea power, were able to create a large Indian Ocean empire. During the course of the 19th century, European navies also played an important role in maintaining good order at sea, eradicating piracy and countering slavery. The decolonisation process after the Second World War ended British hegemony in the Indian Ocean. The subsequent Cold War was again marked by superpower rivalry in the region, enhancing the region's global strategic value. When this period came to an end, Indian Ocean countries to a certain extent rediscovered some of the economic, social and cultural facets that made the ocean the bridge between Africa, Asia and Australasia. However, regional interaction and cohesion still leave much to be desired. Indian Ocean security is now no longer the domain of colonial states or superpowers, but has become multifaceted and dynamic. New role players such as India and China have become major powers, and new national alliances are changing the scene. But current global realities have introduced maritime security problems as non-state actors are influencing security in the area directly and fundamentally. This is a serious development since the rich Indian Ocean maritime trade, which includes much of the world's energy trade, is crucial to the global economy. It seems that many of the lessons of centuries gone by are again being learned - rather than doing battle, navies have to project power and play a diplomatic role to maintain good order at sea. Maritime security is a broad, somewhat amorphous area of focus, and the relevant literature covers everything from physical safety and security measures to port security, terrorism and more. A coherent definition is therefore difficult to determine, but, for the purpose of this paper, maritime security deals with the prevention of illicit activities in the maritime domain. It could be linked directly to the national security efforts of a specific country, or it could cover regional and international efforts to enforce maritime security. This paper centres on the strategic value of the Indian Ocean and the relevant maritime security characteristics and threats. Particular attention is given to issues relevant to Africa. The paper concludes with possible solutions and highlights the importance of international and regional cooperation. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Paper no. 236: Accessed September 29, 2016 at: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper236.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper236.pdf Shelf Number: 140516 Keywords: Maritime Crime Maritime Security Piracy/Pirates |
Author: Sahan Foundation Title: Human Trafficking and Smuggling on the Horn of Africa-Central Mediterranean Route Summary: As Europe struggles to manage its largest migrant crisis in more than half a century, attention has focused largely upon the refugee flows from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, where years of war and instability are driving the exodus. But in 2015, an estimated 154,000 migrants entered Europe via the Central Mediterranean Route – an increase of nearly 400% over the previous year, and more than 1,000% over 2012 – most of them from the Horn of Africa. By far the largest contingent of migrants – nearly 39,000 in 2015 – is from the sub-region's second smallest country: Eritrea. In contrast with the mass, largely uncontrolled movements of refugees from the Middle East, irregular migration from the Horn of Africa is dominated by highly integrated networks of transnational organised criminal groups. Coordinated by kingpins based chiefly in Libya and the Horn of Africa, these networks "recruit" their clients via schools, the Internet and word of mouth; they corrupt government officials to ensure seamless travel across borders; they collude with Libyan militias to secure safe passage across the desert to launching points on the southern shores of the Mediterranean; and they cast their human cargoes adrift at the limit of Libyan territorial waters in order to avoid interdiction and arrest by European security forces. Inception and Purpose of the Report Security has long been a shared preoccupation of countries of the region. The "revitalisation" of IGAD in 1996 expanded the organisation’s mandate to more directly address challenges of peace and stability in the sub-region, including, under Article 18(a), "effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace, and stability." In 2002, the states of the region signed the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol, which outlined the various components of a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) built around structures, objectives, principles, and values, as well as decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent. In this context, in 2003, the IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government endorsed a new strategy for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (CPMR), which was enlarged upon in October 2005 to develop an IGAD “Peace and Security Strategy” in line with APSA. Although the new strategy remained heavily focused on inter-state and intra-state conflict, it called for the enhancement of IGAD activities on countering emerging transnational security threats. IGAD, coming to terms with the expanding scope of regional security challenges, adopted a new Security Strategy in December 2010 and, in October 2011, launched the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP), whose expanded mandate included counter-terrorism, transnational organised crime (TOC), maritime security, and security institutions' capacity-building. Details: Sahan Foundation, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: http://eritreanrefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/IGAD-Sahan-2015-Trafficking-Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://eritreanrefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/IGAD-Sahan-2015-Trafficking-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 147783 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityOrganized Crime |
Author: Ghosh, P.K. Title: Waiting to Explode: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Summary: Till the early 1980s, piracy was often dismissed as being "archaic Tand folklore of the past", rarely entering the main maritime discourse. But true to its nature, 'modern' piracy has emerged with a vengeance in many hotspots of the world. Modern piracy is an extremely complex problem that is often the manifestation of various socio-political dynamics of a particular area. Each area has its own unique methodology of piracy that is often different from other regions. In an attempt to fully understand the intricacies of piracy, different methodologies can be adopted. While some experts follow the geographic classification, others prefer categorising according to the intensity of attacks or the differing rationale behind such attacks. The most commonly accepted method is geographic classification, i.e. where the attacks take place. It has been noticed that pirates operating in a particular area naturally fellow certain ethos and a distinct methodology. Thus, there is the overarching 'Asian Piracy', which has various subtypes depending on the precise area of operation. This includes Malaccan piracy, once rife in the Strait of Malacca, which has now waned due to combined multi-pronged response strategies by the bordering States of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Piracy in the South China Sea is similar to Malaccan piracy in many ways. The Bangladeshi variety, occurring mainly off Chittagong, and the Indian variety, off the eastern and the western coasts, are similar and often amount to petty theft. They can be termed as armed robbery occurring near the coast. While media hype has riveted global attention on piracy emanating from the failed state of Somalia (and the semi-autonomous state of Puntland), piracy elsewhere has not received the attention it deserves. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, on the western side of Africa, has often been glossed over by the world at large even though it is rising exponentially and is considered more violent and complex than piracy in the Indian Ocean. The reason for this lack of focus could be that, unlike in the Gulf of Guinea, Somalian piracy affects a larger number of shipping companies and their merchant ships. The keen interest of affected countries is evident from the large military presence in the Horn of Africa coupled with a demand for greater synergy between the myriad task forces and respective navies. No such intense international effort is visible in the Gulf of Guinea although the situation is equally grave with oil supplies being affected and heightened chances of attacks taking place. This paper aims to analyse the reasons for the rise of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, its characteristics, the primary drivers for the growing menace and international responses; it also compares the differences in modus operandi between Gulf of Guinea and Somalian piracy. Finally, the paper suggests a set of recommendations on how to overcome the problem given the constraints of the prevailing atmospherics. Details: New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2013. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 16, 2017 at: http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/OccasionalPaper_46.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Guinea URL: http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/OccasionalPaper_46.pdf Shelf Number: 146976 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/Pirates |
Author: Larson, Jessica Title: Learning from Danish Counter-Piracy off the Coast of Somalia Summary: ABSTRACT Since the mid-2000s, piracy off the coast of Somalia has posed a serious threat to international shipping and the safety of seafarers. As a seafaring nation, combating Somali piracy quickly became an important security and foreign policy priority for Denmark. This report documents Denmark's recent role in international counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia and examines the challenges and opportunities posed by Danish involvement. The report offers central points for policy-makers to take into account when planning future participation in international maritime security operations, including other forms of maritime crime such as drug- and weapon-smuggling in the Indian Ocean and human trafficking in the Mediterranean. The report identifies four areas in particular in which Denmark may contribute to maritime security. These areas are aligned with Danish capabilities and interests, as well as critical gaps in existing international engagement. They are: - continuing support to the international agenda of multilateralism in maritime security; - emphasising long-term capacity-building of regional maritime security capabilities; - accounting for local conditions in policy planning regarding cooperation with regional states; - strengthening Danish maritime security policy by systematically evaluating civil-military cooperation. Details: Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 12, 2019 at: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/1236845/Report_10_Somalia_piracy_WEB.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Somalia URL: https://www.diis.dk/en/research/new-diis-report-unfolds-danish-counter-piracy-action Shelf Number: 154101 Keywords: Civil-Military CooperationDenmarkDrug-SmugglingForeign PolicyHuman TraffickingMaritime SecurityPiracySeafarersSomaliaWeapon-Smuggling |
Author: Balogun, Wasiu Abiodun Title: Crude oil theft, petrol-piracy and illegal trade in fuel:an enterprise-value chain perspective of energy-maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea Summary: he Gulf of Guinea (GoG) has developed into a global energy-maritime crime hotspot, with Nigeria being the epicentre of illegal oil-related maritime activities in the region. For several decades, scholars have sought to justify crude oil theft, petro-piracy and illegal fuel trade especially in the waters of Nigeria, in the context of greed-grievance. While that approach provides a basis for understanding the realities of illegal energy-maritime activities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, it does little to explain how the illicit activities have evolved into a global enterprise it is today, the dynamics of the business and the infrastructure that sustain the criminality. Against the backdrop of this limitation in existing theoretical underpinning of illegal energy-maritime activities in the GoG, this study adopts an enterprise-value chain model which, moving beyond the greed-grievance narrative, emphasises the primacy of both the enterprise and the marketplace (not players in the market) in explaining, and understanding the dynamics, complexities and persistence of crude oil theft, petro-piracy and illegal fuel trade in the GoG. The enterprise-value chain approach as adopted in the study, offers an advantage of interdisciplinary perspective, combining Smith's enterprise theory of crime and Porter's business management concept of value chain to understanding energy-maritime criminality in the GoG. The enterprise-value chain model sees the tripod of crude oil theft, petro-piracy and illegal trade in fuel as an organised crime; a well-structured economic activity whose business philosophy hinges on the provision of illegal goods and services. Such activities exist because the legitimate marketplace has limited capacity to meet the needs of potential customers. Within the enterprise-value chain framework, the study identifies, and analyses the dynamics of overlap, cooperation and conflict among the different players in the illegal energy-maritime industry as well as mutually beneficial relationships between formal and informal energy-maritime economies. Such an overlap is critical to understanding both the nature of the business and its sustaining value chain. The study concludes that current energy-maritime security architecture in the Gulf of Guinea does not capture the organised, enterprise nature of illicit offshore and onshore activities and its sustaining value chain, which highlights its inherent limitation viz-a-viz the region-s quest for energy-maritime security. There is therefore an urgent need to address this seeming gap as it determines significantly how the phenomenon is considered both for academic purposes and public policy. It is this obvious gap in both academic literature and policy on maritime security in the GoG that this study intends to fill. The study, in the context of its theoretical framework, develops a business approach to enhancing energy-maritime security in the GoG. Details: Lancaster, UK: Lancaster University, 2018. 313p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed February 19, 2019 at: http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/129813/ Year: 2018 Country: Guinea URL: http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/129813/ Shelf Number: 154670 Keywords: Crime HotspotsIllegal TradeMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityOil TheftPiracy |
Author: Palliser, Stuart J. Title: Salt Water Thieves:; Policy Reforms to Address Somali Piracy Summary: Piracy is one of the worlds most ancient - and romanticized - crimes. Until recently, however, it existed more in the collective historical imagination than on the high seas, and while several piracy hotspots existed, the crime seemed almost benign when compared to other contemporary security threats such as terrorism, human traffickers and drug cartels. But piracy is not benign - it threatens the smooth flow of global trade on which so many countries rely. Nor is piracy dead, indeed incidents have increased rapidly in recent years until they have reached levels that have drawn the worlds attention. Everything about the re-emergence of piracy on the global radar screen is shocking. From their origins to the brazen nature of their attacks, the pirates of Somalia have taken the world's shipping industry off guard and collected millions of dollars in ransom payments. In response, states from all over the world have stationed warships in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean in the hope of curtailing the ever-increasing number of attacks in the region. These warships, however, have had little effect on pirate activities. What should the world do next? This monograph explores the failure of the state in Somalia and ties this to the birth of piracy there. It also compares piracy off the coast of Somalia to piracy in the world's former pirate hotspot, the Malacca Strait. From these explorations, the monograph makes both short- and long-term recommendations about how to address the piracy. The short-term recommendations do not involve new resources or new forces, but rather utilize the naval forces that are already present in the region to address a situation which is costing the world millions of dollars and only showing signs of getting worse. The long-term recommendations utilize the lessons learned in the Straits of Malacca and build on the involvement not just of international players but of the entire region. Details: Halifax, NS: Dalhousie University, 2009. 135p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed March 19, 2019 at: https://www.dal.ca/sites/cssd/publications/full-list/salt-water.html Year: 2009 Country: Somalia URL: https://www.dal.ca/sites/cssd/publications/full-list/salt-water.html Shelf Number: 155045 Keywords: Maritime Crime Maritime SecurityPiracy/Pirates |
Author: United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Title: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces Should Enhance Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug Activities Summary: What GAO Found: Many federal agencies are involved in efforts to reduce the availability of illicit drugs by countering the flow of such drugs into the United States. Among them are the Department of Defense (DOD), which has lead responsibility for detecting and monitoring illicit drug trafficking into the country, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is responsible for securing U.S. borders to prevent illegal activity. DOD and DHS lead and operate task forces - Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South, JIATF-West, and three DHS Joint Task Forces (JTF) - to coordinate and conduct counterdrug missions and activities. Task force officials reported that the task forces coordinated effectively with each other when they had shared purposes and overlapping or shared geographical boundaries (see map). The task forces also used coordination mechanisms that align with best practices, such as working groups and liaison officers, to minimize duplication of their missions and activities. Each of the five task forces GAO reviewed has performance measures, but only JIATF-South uses output (e.g., number of detected smuggling events) and outcome-based measures to assess the effectiveness of its activities. Specifically, JIATF-South developed an outcome-based measure of its overall effectiveness: the percentage of smuggling events it detected and provided to law enforcement that resulted in disrupted or seized illicit drugs. JIATF-West evaluates its numerous initiatives and activities, for instance, by determining if they were executed as planned, but has not established a vital few performance measures that consistently convey the overall effectiveness of its activities. Lastly, the DHS JTFs' performance measures are not outcome-based and do not fully assess the effectiveness of the task forces' activities. Enhancing their measures would better position JIATF-West and the JTFs to demonstrate contributions and convey trends in the overall effectiveness of their activities. Why GAO Did This Study: The U.S. government has identified illicit drugs, as well as the criminal organizations that traffic them, as significant threats to the United States. In 2017, over 70,000 people died from drug overdoses, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. DOD and DHS created joint task forces to help facilitate and strengthen interagency efforts in combating the flow of illicit drugs, particularly in the maritime domain. GAO was asked to review the structure of these task forces and their ability to coordinate and conduct missions effectively. Among other objectives, this report (1) assesses the extent to which the task forces coordinate effectively to minimize duplication, and (2) examines how the task forces measure the effectiveness of their missions and activities. GAO reviewed and assessed documentation on the task forces' missions, coordination efforts, and performance assessments and compared them to best practices from prior work, departmental guidance, and federal internal control standards. GAO also met with task force officials to discuss and observe planning and coordination activities. What GAO Recommends: GAO is making three recommendations, including that JIATF-West establish a vital few, consistent performance measures for its overall performance; and that DHS develop outcome-based performance measures for the JTFs' activities. DOD and DHS concurred with the three recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2019. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 16, 2019 at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/700187.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-441 Shelf Number: 156803 Keywords: Border Security Counterdrug Criminal Networks Criminal Organizations Drug Smuggling Illicit Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs Maritime Crime Maritime Security |